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Throughout the period 1945-1961 the Soviet Union was
strategically inferior to the United States. The Soviets sought
to redress this imbalance, and the United States endeavored to
remain superior. An examination is made of each major strategic
arms innovation, in context, to determine its relationship to
the action/reaction process. No single pattern of interaction
is recognized, but one unmistakable characteristic does emerge.
The United States consist ant ly reacted strongly even when
enjoying a decisive weapons margin if a threat were perceived
to its strategic superiority.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Pre-World War II U. S. military strategy was, in the main,
based on geographic remoteness. It was felt that any future
war would begin because of some act beyond the control of the
United States, and it would occur overseas. The prevailing
balance of power would require some time to be upset, and the
vastness of the oceans would allow time for the United States
to mobilize and bring its industrial potential to bear.
After World War II plans were made to fight the next
war in terms of World War II. Deficiencies that had existed
were corrected, but their appropriateness to the Cold War
situation, if any, was purely a matter of luck.
With the advent of the Cold War something else was
called for. Modern technology had reduced the vastness of
the oceans, and weapons were becoming available which promised
damage of a much higher order in relation to the effort
required in their delivery. The old balance of power concept
deteriorated in the ashes of post-war Europe and left in its
place a vast power vacuum. After Stalin's February 1946
speech there was little doubt that the Soviet Union was a
contender to fill that vacuum. If the Soviets were to be con-
fronted anywhere on the globe it had to be by the United
States. This meant an end to the historic U. S. policy of
isolation between wars. The Soviets could not be confronted
and contained by a mobilization strategy dependent on time
to prepare armed forces and industry.
7

To halt the Soviet advance another strategy was required.
The first proposed was the "Containment Thesis," suggesting
that the Soviets could only be dealt with from a position of
strength. The strength called for was "balanced" forces in
order to blunt any Soviet probe at the time and place of
occurrance. Economy-mindedness prevented the development of
the "balanced" forces believed required, so the strength to
meet Soviet threats came from the nuclear delivery systems of
the United States. Until about 1950 substantial nuclear
systems were not truly forces in being either, however. More
and more reliance became placed on the "bomb," and delivery
capability was expanded until the strategy evolved into one
x
of deterrence The nuclear forces in being were then believed
strong enough to deter Soviet encroachment. When the forces
were strong enough, that strategy was articulated as "massive
retaliation." Any Soviet threat would be met with instant and
overwhelming force, aimed at the Soviet Union.
The reliance placed by the United States on its deterrent
force also became a source of extreme sensitivity. The
United States lacked the conventional forces to meet the
A military strategy of deterrence dissuades an opponent
from attacking by holding out to him the sufficiently great
probability that he will suffer a net loss as a result of an
attack. A strategy of defense is designed to reduce one's
own losses. Deterrence, therefore, reduces the probability
of being attacked, while defense reduces the consequences of
being attacked. For further discussion of deterrent strategies
see Snyder, Glenn H., D eterrence and Defense , Princeton Univer-
sity Press, Princeton, New Jersey, lyol.
8

Soviets in the field and relied almost exclusively on the
threat of "massive retaliation." This meant that any menace
to the delivery system placed the entire American strategic
position in jeopardy. Consequently, any Soviet move that
threatened the ability of the United States to "massively
retaliate" brought about a reaction frenzy.
In the action/reaction process of an arms race, each
opponent views certain acts of the other as threatening and
reacts accordingly. Some actions can set off a lengthy chain
of reactions. Others cause no reaction. The U. S. - Soviet
arms race was not a classic, such as the 1904-1914 Anglo-
German Dreadnaught competition where each side responded by
building more and bigger battleships. There is a high degree
of consistancy, however.
Some strategic arms actions resulted from evolutionary
changes to existing systems. In other cases new technology
led to the development of a system, although not necessarily
to the purchase of significant quantities. Occasionally there
was a hardware reaction to a political development, and on at
least one occasion public pressure brought about a large
reaction despite opposition by the leaders. Hardware reactions
were in the form of additional procurement of existing systems,
development of new systems, or expediting development and/or
procurement.
Throughout the period covered by this paper, 1945-1961, the
Soviets were in a position of strategic inferiority. They
sought first to counter the ability of the United States to
strike them with impunity, and then they sought a deterrent
9

force of their own. The steps taken by the Soviets in the
pursuit of these goals caused the interaction process that be-
came the post-World War II arms race.
This paper will be concerned with the interaction process
involving only strategic systems in the purist sense. The
interaction of conventional and/or tactical forces will be
minimized. The paper is divided chronologically into four
periods, separated by significant events which set the tone
for the following years. An attempt is made to examine each
major strategic arms innovation, in context, to determine if
it were a part of the action/reaction sequence or the result
of some other stimulus.
II. NUCLEAR MONOPOLY 1945-1949
A. THE IMPACT AND DEVELOPMENT OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN THE
UNITED STATES
The first five years of the "Atomic Age" were dominated
by the United States in terms of nuclear weapons development,
production, and deployment. It was a period in which, for the
most part, the United States failed to fully appreciate or
utilize the monopoly that existed, placing remarkably little
military or political importance on the early nuclear devices.
This was due, to a great extent, to the conclusions reached
by the United States Strategic Bombing Survey published shortly
after the war. The most widely held interpretation of this
report credited little importance to allied strategic bombing
in forcing the capitulation of Germany or Japan. Despite
this, the temporary postwar monopoly of nuclear weapons was
10

the basis for the United States* policy of containment of the
Soviet Union. The concept of nuclear deterrence gradually-
found its way into American thinking in the late forties, but
a full-blown doctrine of deterrence through retaliatory attack
and the development of forces and bases to give it real meaning
still lay largely in the future.
In the early period of nuclear monopoly the ability of the
United States to construct and deliver a workable device was
a historical fact. They had detonated the world's first nuclear
device on July 26, 1945 near Alamogordo, New Mexico, and later
on 6 August and 9 August dropped bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki,
2Japan respectively.
As overshelming as this advantage might appear, the ability
to explode three weapons did not mean that they were being
mass producedo A nuclear monopoly did exist but the ability
to exploit it was limited. The first production run of nuclear
weapons, in the last months of the war, appears to have been
planned for no more than twelve devices. With the dropping of
the bomb on Nagasaki there was only one completed weapon re-
maining in the nuclear arsenal. Production and assembly of
weapons thereafter proceeded very slowly, and stockpile numbers
Wolfe, Thomas W. and Ermarth, Fritz, The Interaction Process
and Its Influence on Major Soviet Arms Decisions
,
Rand Corp.,
R-118U-PR, Santa Monica, Gal., 1973, p. 22.
2Hewlett, Richard G. and Duncan, Francis, Atomic Shield 1947 -
1952 , The Pennsylvania State University Press, University Park,
P~a77 1969, ppo 672-673.
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undoubtedly fell far short of those reported in the press in
3the late forties.
Two bombs were detonated at Bikini in 194-6 to determine the
effects on warships and possibly to demonstrate that the
United States was still in the business. This occurred shortly
before the Baruch Plan was presented to the United Nations,
None was detonated in 1947, Despite the fact that new facilities
were being put into use throughout the post-war period,
production lagged, a result of a critical shortage of qualified
personnel. In 1948 the total American stockpile of nuclear
3Precise numbers of weapons constructed and stockpiled
are not available. These were not written down for security
reasons, and even the President received stockpile figures in
verbal briefings. There is evidence, however, that in this
period, given the planned wartime use and construction capacity
of the day that the initial production run was for twelve weapons.
(See "The Balance of Military Power," The Atlantic Monthly
,
June 1951, vol. 187, no. 6, pp. 21-27.1
Hewlett, Richard G. and Anderson, Oscar E., Jr., The New
World 1939-1946 , The Pennslyvania State University Press,
University Park, Pa., 1962, pp. 624-625.
The Baruch Plan was a postwar proposal presented by the
United States. It involved supervised abolition of nuclear
v/eapons, to be accomplished by an international monopoly for
nuclear research and production for non-military purposes, the
monopoly to be free of any national veto. The Soviets rejected
the plan. (See Quester, George, Nuclear Diplomacy , The Dunellen




weapons was probably under 150 warheard, and perhaps under
5
one hundred.
B. EARLY SOVIET EFFORTS IN NUCLEAR WEAPONS DEVELOPMENT
For the Soviet Union the war in June 1941 forced a re-alloca-
tion of available resources to the resistance of the German war
machine. This essentially brought an end to a progressive
and active program of nuclear research in the Soviet Union, a
program which had been in effect since the early thirties and
had closely paralleled the Anglo-American program in the pre-
war years. There is evidence that the year 1940 was the high
point in the early history of Soviet nuclear physics. They
were beginning extensive radiochemical studies and conducting
experiments on the nature of the fission process, gaining con-
clusive proof of the spontaneous fission of uranium in that
6year.
c
By 1948 some newspaper accounts placed the number of Hiro-
shima size nuclear weapons as high as 2,500. At the end of the
war large numbers of skilled workers and scientists returned
to the private sector, and the more inefficient production
facilities of the Manhattan Project were shutdown. Program
management was transferred from the Army to the Atomic Energy
Commission. Additionally, all weapons made prior to mid-1948
were hand-made, laboratory models-Mark 1 or Mark 3's.
stone" test series in April and May 1948 was to prove
bility of the Mark 4, the first assembly-line weapon.
series was nearly called off due to the Berlin crisis
the three "Sandstone" weapons. This does not connote
stockpile. (See Questor, op. cit. pp. 4-6;
op. cit., pp. Hewlett and Anderson, op.
175, 176.)
In 1938 or 1939 control of nuclear
Union was transferred to the Academy of
the "favor of the government." In this
accelerate its activities reaching a peak in late 1940
promise of even more to come when the war broke out in
it Union(See Arnold Kramish, Atomic Energy in the Sovie










research in the Soviet
Sciences where it enjoyed






Soviet nuclear development halted with the German invasion
and was not reinstituted until 1943. The parallel development
which existed up to this point can be misleading and distorted
if viewed against the background of a race for military weapons
in the postwar period. The Russians may, in fact, have con-
sidered themselves in a race with the Western world during the
period 1930-1941) but it does not necessarily follow that the
goal they had in mind was an atomic bomb. Neither the Anglo-
American nor, so far as available evidence shows, the Soviets
had made such a decision by the middle of 1941. The final
decision to engage in a weapons development program was not
made by the United states until November 1941 after nearly
two years of painstaking inquiry and difficult deliberation.
By this time the Soviet Union had already been forced by
circumstances beyond its control to stop or postpone its
7
nuclear research program.
Following the demonstration by a Western scientist that
a nuclear chain reaction was possible, the Soviets reinstituted
a small nuclear program which was probably confined to the
monitoring of Western technology. On December 2, 1942, at the
University of Chicago, Enrico Fermi achieved the world's first
chain reaction and as the culmination of three year's labor,
showed the possibility of "transmutation of atoms on an






that a chain reaction could even by achieved. Probably as
a direct result of the successful work at the University of
Chicago the previous year, the Soviets had reinstituted a
full-blown research program in nuclear energy by the fall of
1943. 9
The American nuclear test at Alamogordo on July 26, 1945,
proved forever that a bomb would work. It also offered a
glance at the Soviet public attitude toward nuclear weapons.
At the Potsdam meeting in 1945, Truman announced to Stalin
that "we have an entirely novel form of bomb, something quite
out of the ordinary, which we think will have a decisive
10
effect upon the Japanese will to continue the war." To the
surprise and probably disappointment of both Truman and
Churchill Stalin acknowledged the statement and said he hoped
they would use the new weapon but asked no further questions
about it and dropped the subject. In retrospect we know that
the Soviet Union had been kept abreast of the Anglo-American
In 1966 famed Soviet physicist, Igor N. Golovin, in an in-
terview with the New York Times stated that "Moscow ordered an
all-out effort to build an atomic bomb in the summer of 1942,
when German troops had overrun much of European Russia." This
early bomb decision date for the Soviet Union is almost univer-
sally rejected in the West given the strain on the Soviet war-
time economy and the lack of possible short-term results from
such a program and given the absence of the proof of the possi-
bility of even obtaining a chain reaction. Soviet survival was
paramount in the immediate future and this did not depend upon
the long-term development of a new weapon. (See Kramish, op.
cit







nuclear development program through effective espionage
efforts. At this time, however, Stalin had probably not yet
been informed of the Alamogordo test which was conducted
eight days earlier. It was this same enigmatic countenance
which was to reflect the official Soviet government attitude
toward the development of nuclear energy at the end of the
war, at least as it was presented to the public. Pronounce-
ments of the Soviet Union on nuclear weapons in the period
1945 to 1949 consistantly labeled them as useless and mili-
tarily insignificant, incapable of reversing the outcome of
any war. In public the atomic bomb was generally given no
credit for the Japanese surrender, this being ascribed instead
to the Soviet entry into the war.
Following the Alamogordo test Stalin apparently decided
to accelerate the Soviet program despite the proclaimed posi-
12tion which downplayed the importance of such a device.
Work continued on the military nuclear program, but it was
advertised as being directed solely at industrial and medical
uses. Official dissatisfaction with the lack of progress in
the program was demonstrated in 1947 when "a number of
specialists who had been working on atomic projects were
MacKintosh, J. M., Strategy and Tactics of Soviet
Foreign Policy
,
Oxford University Press, New York, 1963
,
p. 90,
Soviet physicist, Igor N. Golovin disclosed in 1966
that Soviet scientists were ordered to accelerate their
efforts following the 1945 Alamogordo test in the United




arrested for negligence and lack of results." Later that
same year Molotov announced to the world that "the USSR knows
the secret of the atomic bomb." By that time the development
of a group of atomic weapons for aircraft and missile delivery
15had become the most important of all Soviet military requirements.
Although 1947 is the year in which the Soviets chose to
claim they developed the atomic bomb—based on what they felt
was their ability to proceed with development and construction
confidently —the source of Molotov s statement more than likely
13An indication of the state of affairs in 1947 comes
from Colonel G. A. Tokaev, a Soviet jet and rocket expert who
escaped to the West in 1948. Beria, head of the MKVD, took
personal control of nuclear research and, according to Tokaev,
a number of specialists who had been working on atomic projects
were arrested in 1947. (See Kramish, op„ cit ., pp. 109-110.)
TVIolotov's statement of November 6, 1947, that there
was no longer any "secret about the atomic bomb," was seen
merely as a claim that the Soviet Union had learned the tech-





Kilrnarx, Robert A., A History of Soviet AirPower
,
Fredrick A. Praeger, New York, 1962, p. 219.
it
"This claim is illustrative of the retrospective and
quantitative projections that have been characteristic of many
of the Soviet claims of arms superiority. Soviet disclosure
philosophy seems to consider that once a certain qualitative
stage is reached—that is, when it is known how to proceed and
a weapon is effectively under production—then this automatically
implies possession of the weapon. Consistant with this philos-
ophy, an announcement of a weapon capability also usually
falsely implies that the Soviet stockpile of that weapon is
boundless, or at least sufficient It is peculiar how Western
reaction bolsters the operation of such a crude propaganda
device. For it seems that some Western observers may be prone
to express skepticism of a particular Soviet development, but,
once it has been developed, the same observers automatically
assume the validity of anything else rumored or stated about
the weapon." The above described interaction is one we will see







stems from the development and operation of the Soviet's first
reactor which came into operation about August 15, 1947 , with
their first successful chain reaction. Two more years passed
before the Soviets are known to have detonated their first
nuclear device. It had only been under the urging of Admiral
Strauss of the AEC that the United States had finally instituted
a program of reconnaissance flights which led to the detec-
tion of a Soviet nuclear detonation which had occurred on
August 29, 1949. The Soviets had now officially entered
the nuclear age.
C. POSTWAR STRATEGIC POSITION
The end of World War II found the West clamoring for
disarmament at a time when the Soviet military strength still
appeared to be quite impressive. Having determined that any
rollback of Soviet influence was not feasible, the United
States and the Truman Administration were still determined
to resist Soviet expansion. Such determination manifested
1 fs
The exact date of the Soviet nuclear reactor start-up has
not been disclosed, but the Soviets claim it was in operation
prior to the start-up of the British reactor on August 15, 1947.
( Ibid ., p. 114.)
17
On 3 September 1949 a WB-29 weather reconnaissance plane
picked up measurable radioactivity at an altitude of 18,000 feet
east of the Kamchatka Peninsula. The sample was inconclusive,
but several special flights were launched for additional samples
over the Pacific, and other routine flights began to report
high levels of radioactivity. The radioactive cloud was
tracked across the United States, and the British were requested
to assist tracking it across Europe. The results were con-
clusive. (See Hewlett and Duncan, op. cit «, pp. 362-365.)
18

itself in 1947 after the collapse of British support of the
Greek and Turkish governments. The immediate response of the
United States was a proclamation of an "anti-aggression"
IS
"Truman Doctrine," followed by the Marshall Plan.
The world situation had thus set the stage for the post-
war American foreign policy which was to receive definition
with the 1947 "Sources of Soviet Conduct" article by George
19Kennan. This came to be known as the "containment thesis."
This article did little more than articulate the general feelings
which had become more prevalent in the United States and had
already been expressed by Forrest al and others. It was this
famous article which was to later form the substance of
NSC-20—a recognition of the threat and acknowledgment of the
1$On February 21, 1947 the British government informed
the United States that it could no longer afford to support Greece
and Turkey—both formerly in her sphere of influence. This de
facto British abdication precipitated the Greek-Turkish Aid
Program, more commonly known as the Truman Doctrine. This was
a military-economic program designed to "put the world on notice
that it would be our policy to support the cause of freedom
wherever it might be threatened." On March 12, 1947, Truman
went before Congress and asked for $400 million to get the
program started. The Marshall Plan, or European Recovery Program,
followed the Truman Doctrine and essentially was a program
offering financial assistance to all countries which were strug-
gling to rehabilitate their economies after the war. (For a
more detailed explanation see Phillips, Cabell, The Truman Presi -
dency
, MacMillan Co., New York, 1966, pp. 167-194; Rosser,
Richard F D
,
An Introduction to Soviet Foreign Policy , Prentice-
Hall, Inc., Englewood Cliffs, N. J., 1969, pp. 241-245-
19 The Sources of Soviet Conduct" first appeared under
the authorship of "X." It has generally been acknowledged that
X was, in fact, George Kennan. For the full text of his con-
tainment thesis see "The Sources of Soviet Conduct," Foreign
Affairs xxv (July, 1947), pp. 566-582.
19

conditions in Europe. It outlined most of the military require-
ments of a strategy of deterrence to support a policy of
containment.
In this post war period both the United States and the
Soviet Union developed dissimilar theories of deterrence, a
result of circumstances and tradition. The United States had
just come out of a war with a massive strategic bomber force.
They possessed a working doctrine of strategic offensive war-
fare, a strategic bomber force with extensive operational
experience, and the ability to produce nuclear weapons. The
ingredients for an intercontinental nuclear delivery capability
21
were at hand. The Soviets, on the other hand, posed no
serious strategic bomber threat. During the war they had
only a small, ineffectual, and seldom used long-range bomber
force. Furthermore, it was to be at least another four years
before they were to possess a deliverable nuclear weapon. At
this stage they were then forced to maintain a large standing
army to counterbalance the strategic threat of the United States.
20Huntington, Samuel P., Common Defense, Columbia University
Press, New York, 196l, p. 40.
"Htfolfe and Ermarth, op. cit
., p. 29.
*
The Soviets saw themselves in a position where they had no
direct means of deterring an American nuclear attack from 1945 to
1955. The only means available to the Soviet Union to prevent
such an attack was to increase the strength of their land army
to a point where it could not possibly be challenged on the
Eurasian land mass. They proceeded to do just that. The Soviet
army increased in size from a low of 2.8 million men in 1948 to
over 5.7 million men by 1955, the size they felt was sufficient
to guarantee Soviet security even if attacked first. Not until
1955 when the Soviets had their first operational interconti-
nental bombers did the force levels start to go down,, (See Bottome,
Edgar M., The Balance of Terror
,
Beacon Press, Boston, 1971, p. 4)
20

D. EARLY SOVIET STRATEGIC BOMBER FORCE DEVELOPMENT
Forced to create a bomber force almost from scratch,
the Soviets elected to take the shortest route available.
By confiscating three American B-29's which had landed in
Siberia following raids on Japan in 1944, they were able to
bypass the usual research and development time. Copies of
this B-29, redesignated the TU-4, were in production in five
2?different plants by early 1946 and made their public debut
in a fly-over at the 194$ May Day parade. In March of 1946
the Soviet Long Range Air Force (the counterpart to SAC and
23known as the DA) was reconstituted as a separate force.
Although lacking a nuclear weapons capability, a proven
tactical doctrine, forward basing, an air refueling capability,
and with little strategic bombing experience the Soviets
Large scale production, by early 1946, of this long-
ranged four-engined bomber near Moscow, Kajan, Kiev, Novasibirsk
and Tashkent was underway, although large scale delivery did
not take place until 194$, at which point production was
running from 25 to 50 aircraft per-month. This was made
possible after three B-29's force-landed at an airfield near
Vladivostok and were interned by the Soviets. See Lee, Asher,
ed., The Soviet Air and Rocket Forces
,
Frederich A. Praeger,
Mew York, 1959, p. 10'/; Lee, Asher, The Soviet Air Force ,
Gerald Duckworth and Co., Ltd., London, 1950, p. 177; and
Kilmarx, op. cit., p. 230.
23
It is interesting to note that SAC also came into





constructed 1000 TU-4*s, none of which were capable of
2/
reaching the United States on a round trip mission.
E. SOVIET AIR DEFENCE DEVELOPMENT
At about the same time that the Long Range Air Force
was reestablished, PVO Strany (Air Defence of the Homeland)
gained a new emphasis. With this new surge the Soviets
initiated competitive aircraft design programs for a jet
fighter which produced the MIG-15 of Korean War fame. This
25
aircraft was first flown in December 1947. It is doubtful
that the Soviet Union would have been able to produce this
particular jet fighter at this time had not the British, in
early 1947, sold them 55 Rolls-Royce centrifugal-type, turbo-jet
2.L
The Soviet TU-4 had a maximum combat radius of less
than 1,500 miles, which meant they could hit no major U. S.
cities from existing Soviet bases on a round-trip mission.
They could, however, hit most cities in Europe if flying from
forward bases. The Soviets, unable to develop suitable jet
engines in the postwar era, were completely unsuccessful in
their efforts to develop a long-range jet bomber. The pos-
sibility of the Soviets launching a preemptive, one way mis-
sion against the United States was given serious thought,
particularly in the 1948 political crisiso (Quester, op. cit«
,
p. 40, and Lee, Soviet Air and Rocket Forces , pp. 107-108.)
25The MIG-15 was first test flown in 1947 and began series
production by the end of 1948. By 1949 it was appearing in
large numbers in Germany. Although the MIG-15 was ultimately
the most successful of the early series of point defense jet
fighters, it had been preceeded by the YAK-15 and MIG-9.
These, even with the captured German jet engine technology
proved to be underpowered. (See Lee, The Soviet Air Force
,




engines. ' The Soviets had been the only major combatant to
come out of World War II without having developed a turbo-jet
27
engine of their own. The imported British technology gave
the Soviets the propulsion system needed for their first
modern jet fighter. The importance placed on the defence of
the homeland against the United States strategic threat is
reflected not only in the considerable expenditures allocated
from an already strained economy on a radar warning system
but also in their ultimately producing some 15,000 of the
MIG-15 aircraft. °
F. POSTWAR UNITED STATES STRATEGIC BOMBER FORCE; CREATION,
EXPANSION AND USE
Following the war the major concern in the United States
was for demobilization.. No threat to the national interest
was perceived, and the masses were anxious to return to a
postwar normality. Although research and development continued,
driven mostly by technology, few large governmental purchases
of new materials were made. The Strategic Air Command (SAC)
9^1




At the war's end the Soviets captured intact several jet
engine production plants in Poland and East Germany. Addition-
ally they captured thousands of jet engine technicians, who were
resettled in the Soviet factories, and hundreds of German jet
and rocket fighters. By 1946 they were producing their own jet
engines and aircraft which were wholesale reproductions of Ger-
man models. For a more complete breakdown see Lee, The Soviet
Air Force





was brought into existence in March 1946, but at its inception
it consisted of only nine bombardment groups of B-29's and
B-17*s. Of these, only the 509th Composite Group was equipped
29
and trained to deliver nuclear weapons.
Postwar misunderstandings and belligerence started the
move from research and development to actual procurement. In
1947 SAC started to expand, and in that year its strength
reached l6 bombardment groups. At that time a goal of 21
bombardment groups by January 1949 was set—a goal which was
30
met on schedule.
Early expansion of SAC was achieved by recalling aircraft
from storage. Further expansion came as research and develop-
ment decisions were turned into "buy" decisions with the fol-
low-on to the B-29, the B-50 (about 757° redesigned), being
delivered in SAC in 1948. Larger and faster aircraft were also
on the way. In 1941 the decisions had been made for the devel-
opment of the B-36. The decision to develop the B-47 came in
1944. The B-36 first flew in 1946 and the first of what was
29
At the time SAC was given the nuclear responsibility on
May 1, 1946, it had only one unit, the 509th Composet Group,
capable of nuclear weapons delivery and/or sustained combat oper-
ations-meaning it was the only unit up to strength (See Goldberg,
Alfred, ed., A History of the United States AirForce 1907-1957
,
D. Van Nostrand Co. Inc., Princeton, N.J. 1957, p. 122.)
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To reach the expansion goal of 16 bombardment groups in
1947 SAC had to bring aircraft, all B-29's out of storage.
This same procedure was to be repeated in 1948 and 1949 until
they finally reached a strength of 21 groups in early 1949.
The peak strength of 21 bombardment groups coinsided with the
AEC decision to bring nuclear weapons production to a peak.
(Goldberg, loc. cit.
,
and Shulman, Marshall D., Stalin's Foreign






ultimately to be a buy of 325 aircraft was being delivered to
SAC by 1943. Despite the fact that it first flew in 1947, the
B-47 did not arrive in SAC until 1951.
This was only an indication of what was to come. The
United States had not yet entered into the arms race. These
aircraft buys, while important, were relatively small in
number.
The political crisis of 194& served as the catalyst to
launch the United States into a full scale race for the tape.
Heightened senses were exacerbated when indigenous Communist
forces, with the latent threat of the Soviet Army behind them,
staged a coup d'etat in Czechoslovakia. Then, with Communist
labor unions sabotaging and harassing the governments of France
and Italy and the Truman Administration fearing that United
States intervention might be necessary to prevent coups in
31those countries, the Soviets imposed the Berlin blockade.
Although the decision to go ahead with development of the
B-47 came in 1944 it did not pass its service flight tests un-
til January 1953, nine years later. This greater than usual
development time was the result of extensive modifications which
were carried out to extend the range of this new bomber. An
indication of just how extensive the modifications were, the
weight of the aircraft almost doubled to the final gross weight
of 175,000 lbso Additionally, the first B-47's were to have
straight wings, but an evaluation of captured German data caused
the designers, in September 1945, to opt for a swept wing ver-
sion, ultimately trying over fifty different positions and com-
binations of incidence before selecting the final location.
(See Jones, Lloyd S., U. S. Bombers B-l — B~^9 » Aero Pub-







Response to the Berlin blockade was not with American
ground forces but rather by American airpower. Congress imme-
diately passed a $3.5 billion supplementary defense bill with
32
the highest priority going to aircraft procurement. Large
numbers of SAC bombers were then authorized and SAC continued
to grow not only in strength but also quality as the new air-
frames arrived.
. The United States responded to the Soviet's action in
Germany by sending two additional squadrons of B-29's to Ger-
33
many and two bombardment groups to Great Britain. The con-
figuration of these B-29's is unknown. It is quite possible
that they had not yet been fitted and the crews trained to
carry nuclear weapons. Furthermore, despite urgings from
Defense Secretary Forrestal, Secretary of State Marshall, Air
Force Secretary Symington, and the JCS that nuclear weapons be
released to the custody of the Air Force, President Truman
32In this case, as many more to follow, Congress demonstrated
a willingness to spend, almost without question, as much as
Defense or the individual service thought was needed when faced
with a crisis. Secretary of the Air Force Symington by-passed
both the Secretary of Defense and the President going directly
to Congress to ask for more funding. Congress not only approved
the funding but also authorized a 70 group Air Force. The Presi-
dent simply refused to spend the additional money and the most
the Air Force ever saw was 59 groups. (See Millis, W. ed., The
Forrestal Diaries
,
Viking Press, N. Y., 1951, pp.437, 414-4157)
33SAC had, for some time, been rotating B-29's in and out
of European bases. This was the first time, however, they
were rotated on a semi-permanent basis with the expressed pur-
ose of conveying a nuclear threat to the Soviet Union.
Ibid
., pp. 453-457, 491.)I
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refused to do so for domestic political reasons. This
deployment of bombers to Europe in the face of the Berlin block-
ade was the first explicit forward movement of what amounted
to the American nuclear strike force. This bomber deployment
clearly constituted a step upward in brandishing what was still
35
an American monopoly. ^
G. EARLY AIR DEFENSE EFFORTS IN THE UNITED STATES
The Air Defense Command was established in 1946 when the
Air Force was reorganized along functional lines. In spite
of this there was an almost complete disregard for continental
defense in the early postwar period. In 1947 the Air Force
had submitted the "Supremacy" plan calling for 411 radar
stations at a cost of $400 million, but the lack of a perceived
threat caused rejection by Congress. As the Berlin crisis of
194$ developed the United States was operating only five
World War II vintage radar stations, (four of which were in
37
Alaska), on less than full time basis.
T?his was just prior to U.S. elections, and President Tru-
man felt he would be in a better position to turn custody of
the nuclear weapons to the Air Force after elections, or at







37Robertson, Bruce, ed., United States Army and Air Force
Fighters I9l6-196l
,
Harlyford Publications Ltd., Letchworth,
Herts, England, T^ol, p. 97, see also Quester, op. cit
.
,
pp. 33-34, and Goldberg, op. cit ., p. 130.
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In response to events in 194$ the Air Defense Command
was ordered to provide protection for the northeast and north-
west portions of the United States. This coverage was later
expanded to include the stockpile of nuclear weapons near
Albuquerque, New Mexico. In the absence of a Soviet nuclear
capability the TU-4 was not considered a significant threat to
the United States. The possibility of one-way missions with
conventional bombs created no real danger. The nuclear mono-
poly could last for years, but the Battle of Britain had
indicated that effective defenses could not be created over-
night. An expanded air defense system was necessary for
training if for no other reason.
Fearing that Congress would never approve the large
expenditures called for by the "Supremacy" system, the Air
Force prepared a modified "Permanent System" comprised of
75 early warning radar stations and ten control centers to
39be fully operational by 1952. Congress provided funds for
this compromise in 1949. To give protection in the interim,
the Air Force expanded their meager, temporary network into
a system called "Lashup." It was completed in 1950 by building
installations on government owned land and diverting money





By early 1949 tensions appeared to be somewhat lessening.
The Berlin blockade had ended on May 12, 1949, and the split
between Yugoslavia and Moscow seemed to have eased much of the
problem in Greece. On the domestic scene the presidential
elections were completed and the economy-conscious Truman
Administration was pushing for a lowering of defense expendi-
tures once again. Such cuts in United States defense monies
were undoubtedly welcomed with some sense of relief in the
Soviet Union.
While concern still ran high in defense-minded circles,
the crisis of 194$ and the threat that World War III might
break out with "dramatic suddeness" had passed. Then on
August 29, 1949, a major problem erupted for United States
defense policy—the first Soviet nuclear detonation occurred.
With this occurrence the United States' monopoly came to an
end. New thinking was required as a completely different
spectrum of problems now faced U. S. planners. In this seem-
ingly cool period of relative detente how the United States





For the 1950 budget President Truman placed a $14.2
billion ceiling on military spending, cutting the Air Force
from the Congressional authorization of 70 groups down to 4$
groups. Forrestal called for the authorization of three SAC
bombardment groups over the 21 they already had. This he felt
was needed since the President emasculated the conventional
forces, causing almost total reliance on the nuclear deterrent





III. RETRENCHMENT AND EXPANSION 1949-1953
A. UNITED STATES' REACTION TO THE END OF THE NUCLEAR MONOPOLY
The Soviet nuclear detonation in August 1949 came sooner
than most officials in the United States had anticipated.
The major question at hand for the Truman Administration was
how to handle this unexpected, policy shaping event. At the
unanimous urging of the Atomic Energy Commission, President
Truman announced on September 23 that the Soviet Union had
detonated a nuclear device. This announcement was made after
full consideration of all of the consequences and reminded
the American people that the nuclear monopoly had always
been only a temporary thing.
President Truman had foreseen two basic problems in
announcing the Soviet success. First, there was a fear
expressed in the Administration that disclosure of the
successful Soviet nuclear blast would cause a sense of panic
in the Western world, a situation which ultimately failed to
41
The AEC believed the President should make the announce-
ment as soon as it had been established with certainty that a
Soviet nuclear blast had occurred. They believed that the
information about the detonation was known by too many people
(some 300 by September 19, 1949), and a security leak was
certain to preempt a presidential announcement if it were not
made soon. At the same time the State Department was urging
the President to hold off such an announcement lest it further
worsen the economic situation in Europe given that Great Britain
had just devalued the pound. (See Hewlett and Duncan, op. cit
.
,
pp. 366-368, and Lilienthal, David E., Th e Atomic Energy Years
1945-1950
,
Harper and Row, New York, 19^4", p. 570.)
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materialize. Secondly, the President believed that any-
United States response, even the announcement of the blast
which would disclose the fact that the United States had been
monitoring Soviet activities, might shatter what he saw as
*
a very tenuous detente.
At the same time policy makers were faced with a different
problem, the end to the long-enjoyed United States nuclear
monopoly. The thought of two nuclear powers, the United
States and the Soviet Union, facing each other, each force
deterring the nuclear might of the other, with the Soviets
possessing a staggering conventional force advantage, became
a very real concern for the first time.
This problem had been exacerbated when, in March 1949,
Louis Johnson, the military critic and infamous budget
In a conversation with D. Lilienthal, Chairman of the
AEC , on September 21, President Truman expressed his fears that
the announcement of the "Vermont Affair" (the code word which
signified that the Russians had detonated an atomic device)
would bring things too near panic. (See Lilianthal, loc. cit.
,
p. and Hewlett and Duncan, op. cit . , p. 366-367.)
The Soviet advance on Western Europe had been halted by
1949. Any further probes by the Communists were to be met with
threats of war. The Berlin blockade had failed to prevent the
integration of an independent West Germany into the Western
camp. Yugoslavia had bolted from the Soviet bloc and with it
went the Communist aspirations in Greece. Communist labor up-
heavals in France and Italy had been put down. In the face of
the American nuclear threat the USSR simply was not powerful
enough to change the situation, and Stalin was forced to accept
the status quo in Europe. President Truman is reported to have
seen this quiescent period as one of real detente characterized
by a change in Soviet attitudes. He later attributed this to
their finally achieving a nuclear capability of their own and
with it a lower level of fear of the U. S. In reality it appears
to have been a period of stalemate, at least in Europe, and main-
tained only so long as the power structure could hold the advi-






cutting Secretary of Defense, was appointed by President
Truman. From the beginning Johnson drastically cut military-
expenditures, cutting out the fat, the muscle, and even some
of the bone. Even given the startling new development of a
Soviet nuclear blast, the austerity program was to continue
throughout the early part of 1950.
B. EFFECTS OF THE KOREAN WAR
In response to the Soviet nuclear detonation, defense
planners, in March 1950, released a master plan for United
*
In reality Louis Johnson was probably merely an avid
executioner of Administration policies. He is frequently
credited with the development of "the remainder policy"
(where military budget is determined by what remains in the
budget after domestic considerations) when in actuality the
policy was probably developed by James Webb, former Budget
Director, and was certainly in effect when Johnson came into
office. Nevertheless, he quickly gained the reputation of
being far more concerned with meeting budgetary ceilings than
national security needs. (See Hammond, P.Y., "NSC-68: Pro-
logue to Rearmament," Strategy, Policy and Defense Budgets,
Schilling, W.R., Hammond, P . Y .~ and Snyder, G. H. , Columbia




States military efforts known as NSC-68. This plan had
received only vocal support, although fiscal requirements
were being examined, when the Democratic People's Republic
of Korea (North Korea) attacked across the 3$th parallel on
June 25, 1950. This attack found the United States ill-
prepared to fight a conventional war, even on a limited
scale.
In August 1945, when the Soviet Union attacked Japan,
agreements still had not been made for the occupation of Korea.
In an effort to keep Soviet troops from overrunning the en-
tire peninsula, the United States had secured Soviet agreement
to a temporary division of the country along the 38th paral-
lel By 1950 North Korea was a Soviet satellite, and the
North Korean Army had undergone an accelerated build-up
under Russian tutelage.
*
This report concluded that the Soviet Union had no grand
strategy, of its own but did have three objectives: 1. to pre-
serve their internal power position, 2. to consolidate satel-
lite control, and 3. to weaken any opposing powers and aspire
to world hegemony. Furthermore, it predicted a "year of maxi-
mum threat," 1954, at which time Soviet economic recovery com-
bined with earlier Western neglect of arms expenditures would
allow them to launch a devastating nuclear attack by bombers
on the U.S. To counter this it was deemed essential for the
U.S. to provide protection for its bomber force, construct a
system to warn of a pending attack, and provide means of de-
feating an air attack without being forced to resort to nuclear
retaliation. Additionally, it said SAC should be strengthened
in size and survivability. It further emphasized the inade-
quate force levels, shortcomings in the Western alliance sys-
tem, and economic conditions in Europe. Recommendations were
then made to increase levels of conventional forces to firm
up the military balance—a program calling for substantial
build-ups of Western ground forces. (For more detail see Ham-
mond, op. cit
., pp. 304-307, 320, 348, 357 and Adams, B.D.,
Ballistic Missile Defense
,
America Elsevier Publishing Co. Inc.,
New. York, 1971, p. 10.)
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There is little question today that the Soviets planned
and directed the invasion of South Korea. The invasion, to
many in the West, was a signal of a period of renewed aggres-
sion in Soviet policy. 43 At that time it might well have
been as much a misreading of United States' intentions and
resolve coupled with a simple attempt to capitalize on a
perceived opportunity as any real change in Soviet policy.
By mid-1948 the United States had reduced occupation
forces in Korea to a minimum, with the last of them being
withdrawn from South Korea in 1949.* First General MacArthur
and then, in January 1950, Secretary of State Dean Achison
defined the American "defense perimeter" in Asia as running
through the Phillippines, Okinawa, Japan, and the Aleutians
with no mention of Korea.
This came at a time when the Soviet Union feared that the
pro-American Japanese government might be rearmed. In the
absence of a United States commitment, a swift and sure
victory in Korea might well convince Japan to remain out of
the Western sphere or at least on the fence.
^Rosser, op. cit. , p. 270-271.
*As early as March 1948 there were so few troops in
Korea that it was not economically sound to attempt to
continue such support. In 1949 the United States and the
Soviet Union mutually withdrew all remaining combat troops,
leaving behind only cadres to assist in the training of
local military units. (See Millis, op. cit ., p. 43o, and
Phillips, op. cit ., p. 293.)
34

The completely unexpected reaction by the United Nations
and the United States must have come as a shock to the Soviets.
They were not to enjoy a swift and easy victory, they had
managed to end the apparent political and military stalemate
of the past year and they had awakened and alarmed the Amer-
ican giant—launching the United States into a massive rearma-
ment program.
Conventional forces were now indeed augmented. The Air
Force gained a new impetus with the major reliance still
placed upon the deterrent capability of SAC, and the Navy was
also expanded. The military budget of $14.2 billion in fiscal
year 1951 now leaped to $4$. 2 billion, more than a three fold
increase. Before the year's end the Air Force was expanded
to 68 groups, the Navy to 1028 ships, and the Army to l6
divisions.
Much of the additional funds went into expanding SAC.
Fears that Soviet aggression might further manifest itself in
Europe were responsible for conventional force build-up as
President Truman had originally asked for $13.5 billion
for defense, but Forrestal was able to get this raised to $14.2
billion. Once the Korean conflict erupted the military was
able to push through a series of supplementary appropriation
bills raising the final military budget to a new high of $48.2
billion. (See Hammond, op. cit .
,
p. 351«)
The increase reflected in the 1951 budget growth was
substantial. In mid-1950 the military had ten understrength
divisions, 48 Air Force groups, 671 ships and two very under






well as a political push for the rearmament of West Germany
to strengthen an emerging NATO.
With Communist China's entry into the Korean conflict the
"year of maximum threat," predicted in NSC -6$, was moved for-
ward to 1952. Military goals of ll6l ships, 18 divisions
and twelve regimental combat teams, two and. one-third Marine
divisions, 95 Air Force wings, and 3.6 million men in uniform
were now set for July 1, 1952.
C. STRATEGIC AIR COMMAND EXPANSION
The year 1949 had already shown itself to be one of
further expansion for SAC. Prior to the detection of the
Soviet nuclear detonation, SAC had ordered an additional 75
B-36's to the previously ordered 95. Unable to get additional
Congressional appropriations to buy the 75 aircraft, the Air
Force utilized funds obtained by cancelling some existing con-
tracts. Immediately following the Soviet blast the Air Force
was given authorization to purchase another 155 of the
"Responding to the deteriorating international situa-
tion and the domestic clamor for all-out mobilization, the
Administration rushed the build-up of active military forces.
Under the new plan the year of maximum danger was moved for-
ward from 1954, the time suggested in NSC-68, to 1952." (For




By the target date of July 1, 1952, the military actually
had surpassed most of the goals, and had 1130 ships, 20 divi-
sions with an additional 18 regimental combat teams, three
Marine divisions, 95 Air Force wings and 3.636 million men





intercontinental bombers. At the same time SAC continued
to take delivery of the B-50 reaching its maximum of five
48
wings of this type in 1952. Development of both the B-47
and B-52 continued at a quickened pace. SAC received its
first B-47 in 1951, the same year in which the B-52 made its
maiden flight
.
D. SOVIET SEARCH FOR AN INTERCONTINENTAL BOMBER
In the same field Soviet technology had not yet been up
to the task of developing an intercontinental bomber of its
own. Once the Soviets had entered the nuclear race and had
their first weapons, the problem of delivery vehicles became
acute. However it was not before 1953 that their first truly
intercontinental bomber was to fly.
in
See Schilling, Wo R., "The Politics of National Defense:
Fiscal 1950," Strategy, Politics and Defense Budgets
, pp. 75n-
76n and Jones, op. cit.
,
pp. 124-127.
Htfagner, R., The North American Sabre , Doubleday and Co.
Inc., Garden City, New York, 1963, p. 92.
*
Even though neither the B-47 nor the B-52 were operational
before the Korean conflict had abated, it is doubtful that either
would have been committed to combat had they been available in
great numbers. As it was a maximum of 5 wings of B-29's were
committed, and even though the B-50 was available in quantity
it was held back for fear of compromising the aircraft and its




Not until 1955 were the Soviets to achieve their goal of
a long-range intercontinental bomber force. By that date they
had aircraft capable of two-way missions against the U.S.—
a
capability of the highest priority once they had neclear





Despite the strong desire to have a creditable long-range
bomber force, as was evidenced by the earlier construction of
1000 TU-4's, Soviet jet-engine technology had proven itself
unable to meet the challenge. Airframe design had continued
throughout the period, but in the absence of a powerplant
capable of producing over 10,000 pounds of thrust heavy jet
50
aircraft could be little more than a designers dream.
Nevertheless, in the three years of the Korean War, Soviet
strategic attack hardware requirements appear to have con-
tinued to expand. Jet technology finally reached a point
where in 1951, assuming a lead time of about four and one half
years, the Soviets made the decision to produce the TU-95
50Jet engine development seems to have accelerated in
1948, but the big engines necessary for the intercontinental
bombers were still several years off. To engine the Ilyushin
and Tuplov heavy jet bombers which the Soviets were planning
to make at the outbreak of the Korean War called for engines
of 10,000-15,000 pounds static thrust, and the Soviet technology
and industry were simply incapable of meeting this requirement
at that time. Therefore, until at least late 1952 or early
1953 the Soviet Air Force very likely accumulated at least a
limited stock-pile of atomic weapons for a long-range bomber





Bear, the MI-4 Bison, and the TU-16 Badger. These all became
*
operational after the Korean conflict had ended.
E. AIR DEFENSE IN THE UNITED STATES
Continental air defense gained real importance in the
United States for the first time. A follow-on study to
NSC-68 was conducted in 1951, "Project Charles," which
outlined in great detail the problems of an active air
All three of these aircraft were in some stage of pro-
duction in 1953. The prototype of the MI-4 Bison is known
to have been rolled out in July of that year, and the first
flight was the following November. It was first seen pub-
lically in a ten plane flyover in the 1955 May Day Parade,
and twelve were seen in formation later in July. The MI
-4
was not operational until 1956. Less information is avail-
able on the TU-16 Badger and the TU-95 Bear, but they were
known to be in production in 1953. The prototype of the
TU-16 was first seen in 1952. The first public display was a
squadron sized flyover in the 1954 May Day Parade, but it was
not yet operational. The TU-95 prototype was out by 1955 and
possibly sooner because a seven plane formation was seen in
the Air Force Day Parade in July 1955. (See Stone, Jeremy,
Containing the Arms Race
,
MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass., i960,
pp. 92, 128, Aviation Week , May 10, 1954, vol. 60, no. 19,
p. 14, Aviation Week. May 23, 1955, vol. 62, no. 21, pp. 13-14,
Aviation Week
,
July 11, 1955, vol. 63, no. 2, p. 13 and Green,
William, The World Guide to Combat Planes Vol. 2. Doubleday




defense system. The possibilities of a workable system
gained further credence with the Korean experience. The
efficiency of the early warning network employed by the Com-
munists over North Korea coupled with jet interceptors was
able to force the halt of daylight B-29 raids on Communist
targets.
As late as 1950 air defense was still conceived largely
in World War II terms: an early warning system to alert both
fighter aircraft and anti-aircraft artillery surrounding major
targets. The air battle would be conducted visually by
fighter aircraft, along tactics selected by those on the
scene c Speed of reaction to a raid warning, range of the
flight, and air battle tactics were basically the same as
those which had governed the epic Battle of Britain ten years
51
earlier.
The Korean War now brought about a fresh review of air
defense. It soon became apparent that no single improvement
in any one element would measureably facilitate the ability to
destroy an attacking enemy force. New thinking emerged as it
at
The Charles Report was part of the aftermath of NSC-6&
and stated that the United States was vulnerable to a Soviet
air attack. This was followed by the "Summer Study Group"
in 1952, and recommended the building of the DEW Line. It
re-emphasized the inability of the country to repell an
enemy air attack and called for a crash program to rectify
the shortcomings, most importantly, in the early warning
system. (See Goldberg, op. cit .
,




' Conant, Melvin, The Long Polar Watch
,
Harper and Brothers,
New York, 1962, p. 34.
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became more obvious that with each passing year less and less
alert time would be available with all the major powers entering
the jet age and making major strides forward in aircraft tech-
nology. The additional problem created by a nuclear armed
attacking force meant that the defenders could no longer be
satisfied with the World War II target of ten percent attrition
of attacking aircraft. The Air Force now believed that they
would have to stop at least 70 percent, and perhaps as much
as 95 percent, of the attacking bombers to be effective—
a
52feat they clearly were not up to.
Several studies grew out of the need for some meaningful
change, such as Project Charles previously mentioned, all
pointing to the need for an extensive long range warning net-
53
work covering the continental approaches to the United States.
Eventually, studies in both the United States and Canada led
52In World War II, it was generally assumed that an air
attack could not be pressed if the air defense inflicted more
than ten percent attrition on the enemy bombers. This philosophy,
of course, assumes a protracted air war which extends over some
long period of time. In a nuclear exchange a bomber, in all
probability, would make no more than one strike and certainly no
more than two. Air defense would have to inflict far heavier
damage on the attacker—between 70 and 95 percent—to achieve
the same results. (See Conant, op. cit .
,





In a study conducted in 1949-1950 it was concluded that
"continental air defense was inadequate and would not be sub-
stantially improved by the Permanent System then being installed."
It is interesting to note that 1949, the year the study began,
was the same year that the Air Force convinced Congress that
the $86 million network was essential to national security.
Even after it was determined to be inadequate and offered little
improvement, construction continued, and it became operational
in 1953. (See Goldberg, op. cit .
, pp. 130, 134.)
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to the construction of a network of three separate warning
lines: the Pine Tree Line, the Mid-Canada Line, and the Distant
Early Warning Line (DEW Line). None of these ambitious under-
takings were completed during the period 1949-1953, but the
studies leading to the decisions to undertake such construction
were initiated in this period.
In order to acquire some air defense capability as soon as
possible the Air Defense Command initially utilized reservists
recalled to active service. They were used to man the equip-
ment being installed in the interim radar network, "Lashup,"
as it moved toward the mid-1950 completion date. Air National
Guard units were pressed into active service to provide the
needed fighter protection, and actual interception of unknown
aircraft was authorized by the President for the first time.
On September 1, 1949 the Air Defense Command had been
abolished in favor of an Eastern Air Defense Force and a Western
Air Defense Force under the Continental Air Command (CONAC).
In 1951 the United States secured an agreement with Canada
which allowed the building of Pine Tree in southern Canada.
Pine Tree was the first network to provide both early warning
and ground control intercept capability. It consisted of about
30 separate radar stations and stretched across Canada and the
northern U.S. The Mid-Canada Line and DEW Line agreements were
not reached until 1954 after long negotiations. The Mid-Canada
Line lies on the 55th parallel and was to be constructed by the
Canadians. The DEW Line had received sanction by the President
in his approval of a 1952 NSC policy statement which called for
its construction. It was to be built on the 69th parallel by the
U.S. Even before the formal agreement had been reached the U.S.
was testing equipment in Canada for the effects of cold weather





This proved to be an unsatisfactory arrangement and on January 1,
55
1951, ADC once again became an independent command.
To round out the picture the Air Force sought to improve
its all-weather intercept capabilities. In 1950 the Air
Defense Command acquired improved versions of the F-94, and
by 1951 was receiving its first F-$9's and later the F-$6D*s.
In 1951 Convair was awarded the contract for development of
the "ultimate" interceptor, the F-106, but it soon became
apparent that this aircraft would not be available before 1956.
In the interim something else was needed. The Air Force again
turned to Convair for the F-102, an "off-the-shelf" predeces-
sor of the F-106. It was to be operational by 1954. Ultimately
the F-102 did not gain an operational status until 1956, and
the F-106 was not in service until the end of the decade.
Ironic as it might seem the biggest opponent of air defense
was the user itself, the Air Force. There was general agree-
ment on the need for the expanded system, but at what price?
If the extensive air defense program which had been proposed
was to soak up funding which the offensive-minded Air Force
hierarchy had planned for offensive weapons systems, such as
B-52 development, then the program was unacceptable. The Air
Force referred here to a "Maginot Line psychology" in an effort




56budget. As the possibility of the construction of the hydro-
gen bomb became more a reality the perceived need for air
defense grew. The offense proponents lost as development of
an air defense system continued. This was not the devastating
loss they had expected, however, because the now-higher defense
bueget allowed for such development without seriously penalizing^
the offensive weapons system.
Another major component in the air defense system came
into being on July 1, 1950 with the establishment of the Army
Antiaircraft Command (ARAACOM) to control antiaircraft artil-
lery. Although this was an Army organization, all the anti-
aircraft units were placed under the operational control of
the Air Defense Command. These units were initially equipped
with artillery batteries but were to be rapidly expanded, in
1954, to include the Nike antiaircraft missiles as they became
57
operational.
The Korean War had focused attention on the need for air
defense, yet, at the same time, it served to weaken what air
defenses that existed in both the United States and the Soviet
Union c The need for fighters caused both sides to commit much
56The Air Force saw expenditures for this new air defense
system as draining off and slowing down offensive force growth,
The official higher echelon Air Force position was to push the
offensive weapons systems implying that any air defense system







, pp. 132-133, Adams, op. cit . , p. 18,
and Aviation Week, May 10, 1954, vol. 60, no. 19, p. 18.
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of the inventory of fighter aircraft to the conflict. The
drawing off of these fighter-interceptors undoubtedly weakened
the air defenses of both adversaries and made any potential
bomber attack more likely to penetrate unmolested. The
Soviets having traditionally been more defense-minded had
more defensive aircraft. The re-deployment of thousands of
fighters to the Korean theater undoubtedly had less effect on
defense of the Soviet Union than a similar move would have
on an already strained and meager system of air defense in
the United States. The Soviets, nevertheless, still faced
a far more creditable bomber threat than did the United States.
F. SOVIET AIR DEFENSE DEVELOPMENT AND EXPANSION
The speed at which the Russians had built up their defen-
sive network of radar installations and fighter-intercepbor
forces in the first five years after World War II is a clear
indication of the importance of the threat they credited to
the United States strategic force. By liberal borrowing from
captured German and purchased British jet engine technology,
the Soviets were able to produce large numbers of good day
fighters in the early 1950's.
One area in which they sorely lagged behind the West,
despite the capture of operable equipment in World War II, was
eg
By mid-1952 the Communists were maintaining about 7000
aircraft in the Korean theater. Given that U.S. Air Force pilots
alone destroyed over 900 enemy aircraft in air-to-air combat,
the Soviets ultimately were forced to provide some 8000 aircraft
to the Communist forces. (See Quester, op. cit
. ,
p. 78 and
Futrell, R.F., et al, The United States Air Force in Korea 1950-
1953 , Duell, Sloan and Pierce, New York, 1961, p. 724.)
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in airborne radar, a necessity for all-weather interception
operations. However, they had considerably more success in
duplicating the German early warning and ground control inter-
ception radars.
By the outbreak of the Korean War the Soviets had constructed
a very thin early warning network in the Far East along the
coast lines of the Maritime Provinces near Vladivostock and
59further north in the Magadan region opposite Alaska.
It was the Korean War which proved to be the first real,
largescale test of Soviet made and operated air defense equip-
ment. The Soviets supplied the North Koreans and Chinese with
vast quantities of equipment in the form of early warning
radars, and interceptors. The effectiveness of even this
rudimentary system was demonstrated by the United States Air
Force's decision that, because of heavy losses to MIG-15 inter-
ceptors, all B-29 raids would have to be at night.
By 1946 the first radar early warning units were being
trained and set up to give long-range warning of the approach
of unfriendly planes along the Baltic coasts or over the fron-
tiers of central and eastern Europe." By 1950 this line was
expanded to the Far East, but it was, at best, a very thin sys-
tem, one which would take years to expand, equip, and staff with
personnel trained to the degree necessary to meet the threat of
the growing United States nuclear strike force. (See Lee, Soviet
Air and Rocket Forces
,
p. 121.)
On October 28, 1951 the decision to use the B-29 only
on night raids vas made because there simply were not enough
F-86's available to provide adequate protection for the






The Russian-built radar net was obviously effective and gave
the Communist defenders adequate and consist ant warning of
the approach of United Nations aircraft. Only the absence of
an all-weather fighter prevented them from severely hurting
the attacking bomber forces. Even in daylight hours against
UN fighter sorties, they held a considerable edge because the
early warning network allowed them to choose the time and
place of the fight and gave the defender the advantage of
knowing that the attacker was enroute. Only the superior
skills and training of the United States' pilots accounted
for the eight to one kill ratio over the Communist pilots, not
superior equipment.
This wartime experience had pointed up the serious short-
comings of inadequate airborne and ground control intercept
radars. At best, the most efficient radar to be employed by
the Soviets was the facility at Antung, Peoples Republic of
China. By late 1952 they appeared to have made a break-
through in ground control intercept radar, and Antung received
the first of this new equipment, as good as anything produced
in the West. This new facility could place an interceptor
within two to five miles of a target, but the actual intercept
This eight to one kill ratio is somewhat misleading in
that a total of 121 U.S. planes lost in air-to-air combat to
Communist forces included such aircraft as the prop driven
North American P-51 of World War II vintage. If we look only
at the F—86, which was the only fighter in the theater flown
by U.S. pilots which was comparable to the MIG-15, the ratio
was better than ten to one with the F-86's downing 792 MIG's




still had to be made visually. The network had as many as 25




intercept units. Early warning coverage extended south of
the 3$th parallel.
Without the assistance of an airborne interception radar
the Communist were forced to look to alternative methods.
Night interceptions were aided by the use of radar controlled
search lights which proved themselves to be very effective
against the slow flying night bombers.
Realizing that such crude methods were far less than
optimal, the Soviets continued research and development in the
area of airborne radar, meeting with only limited success.
The latest model of Soviet radar appears to have gone
into Antung (Communist China) in late 1952. Prior to that
time the Antung facility, as elsewhere, appears to have been
made-up of obsolete United States made equipment of World War
II vintage and poor quality Soviet made equipment. (See
Futrell, op. cit », p. 473.)
Communist radar coverage was most effective down the
West coast of Korea with ground control intercept out as far
as 90 miles although accurate interception seemed to not ex-
tend beyond 70 miles from Antung. ( Ibid .
)
Communist forces were provided a number of radar con-
trolled search lights which once locked on a target would
facilitate target spotting by adjacent manually directed
lights. Fighter interceptions were then frequently made with
the slow flying bombers making easy targets for the jets.
Until active jamming was introduced, which successfully
thwarted the search light efforts, the bomber forces sus-




As early as 1952 they flew the YAK-25, their first all-weather
interceptor, but none of these aircraft saw service in
Korea.
In that same year high-ranking Soviet Air Force officers
and leading Soviet aircraft designers held a conference to
study the combat deficiencies of the MIG-15. From that study
group emerged an improved version of the MIG-17. It found
65its way into service in 1954.
Having fallen privy to German developed weapons, the Soviets
were working on a surface to air missile. Like the United
States, their early efforts in perfecting such a weapon met
with only limited success, and none were operational in the
period which encompassed the Korean conflict.
G. HYDROGEN BOMB DEVELOPMENT: THE UNITED STATES' DECISION
One other event of the 1949-1953 period which was to be
the single most important policy and strategy shaping decision
of the postwar period has yet to be discussed—the hydrogen
bomb decision.
^ntil the production of the YAK-25 in 1952, the Soviet
Union had no meaningful all-weather intercept capability. The
effectiveness of the YAK-25 was doubtful even in later years
because of its poor quality airborne radar. None were reported




Although the MIG-17 closely resembled the MIG-15 in appear-
ance it was a completely new design and far superior to its pre-
decessor in performance. V/ork on the MIG-17 quickly led to the
development of the MIG-19, the prototype of which first appeared
in 1953. This twin engined fighter was later to prove itself
to be a superior aircraft and was the backbone of the Soviet




Shortly after the United States' monopoly of nuclear tech-
nology ended, a means of restoring the pre-1949 balance was
discussed in Washington. The obvious means of restoring the
favorable position enjoyed by the United State's was for the
West to proceed with the next generation of bomb development
—
the "Super" or as it was later known, the H-bomb. Admiral
Strauss, then a member of the AEC , first suggested the "Super"
on September 30, 1949 as a reaction to the Soviet nuclear
blast. His suggestion was forwarded to the President. On
October 5 the AEC Advisory Committee met to discuss the feasi-
bility of such a weapon. This group ultimately rejected the
idea for "technological, political, and moral" reasons.
Nevertheless, the Joint Armed Services Committee and the Joint
Chiefs of Staff were determined.
*Oppenheimer's research group, in the summer of 1942, had
discovered the theoretical possibilities of developing a
hydrogen device based on the fusion of very light elements.
Little work was done thereafter because the extreme temperatures
and pressures suggested the need for a fission device to trigger
the reaction, and no such devices were available for experi-
mental uses. Not until the doldrums of the post war years did
Teller and others begin to work to change the theoretical into
real-world operations. At the time of the Soviet nuclear blast
the President was not aware of the existence of such a theory.
Admiral Strauss was able to convey this information to the
President through Admiral Souers, Executive Secretary of the
National Security Council, bypassing Lilienthal who was
against such a weapon from the start. (See Hewlett and Duncan
op. cit .
, pp. $9, 374, and "The Hidden Struggle for the H-Bomb,"
Fortune
,
May 1953, vol. 47, no. 5, p. 109.)
For a more complete reading on the exact reasoning for
the Committee's recommendation that the President reject devel-
opment or even further studies into the feasibility of such
development see York, Herbert F., Race to Oblivion , Simon
and Schuster, New York, 1970, pp. 36-37.
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to proceed with a feasibility study and to have such a weapon
if at all possible. With the urging of such noted scientists
as Edward Teller and E. 0. Lawrence, the President made the
decision to go ahead with the feasibility study phase. This
later led to the decision to produce the device which was
exploded in 1952. The President's decision to proceed with
the project was announced to the press on January 31, 1950
67
after a leak had indicated the project was to be undertaken.
As progress continued in thermonuclear development, with
devices being set off in the 1951 Eniwetok tests which were
68
considered necessary in the development of the Super, oppo-
nents of such a destructive device began to urge the President
to adopt a "no-first-test." Under this plan the United States
would vow not to test a fusion weapon unless the Soviets did.
This proposal was rejected by President Truman, and plans
69for the first test to be comducted in 1952 continued. 7
One of the deciding factors to go ahead with the devel-
opment of the "Super" seems to have been the arrest of Klaus
Fuch in January 1950 in Britain on charges of spying for the
Soviets. Teller remembered that Fuch had been present at a
Los Alamos seminar in 1945 and "may have gleaned the correct
solution." (See "The Hidden Struggle for the H-Bomb," loc. cit. )
The source of the leak was Senator Edwin C. Johnson. On
a locally broadcast television program in New York, he casually
mentioned the "Super" while castigating scientists for security




68Four tests, the Greenhouse series, in April and May 1951
demonstrated thermonuclear principles and provided essential
data necessary to proceed with the "Super" development. (See
Kramish, op. cit
.
, pp. 546, 672.)






On November 1, 1952, three days before the presidential
elections, the United States successfully detonated the
world's first thermonuclear device. The announcement of the
70
success was delayed until 1954.
Much of the leadership in the United States had been
unable to see any clear guarantee of victory or even deter-
rence in being the sole possessor of the atomic bomb, but
the promised thousandfold increase in destructive power of
a hydrogen weapon opened new horizons. A monopoly of hydro-
gen weapons would offer political as well as military advan-
tages not previously enjoyed. In any case it clearly made
obsolete the strategic bombing concepts which had grown out
of World War II and would surely quieten even the most avid
opponent of strategic bombing who based his criticism on the
71
suspected ineffectual use of atomic weapons.
It is clear that the decision on the part of the United
States to proceed with first the feasibility studies and then
the actual construction of a thermonuclear device was in
direct reaction to the Soviets breaking of the nuclear monop-
oly. After all, United States scientists had completed the
70The United States did not officially report the November
1, 1952 thermonuclear test until April 7, 1954. World had long
since leaked out as the outgoing mail was not censored from
Joint Task Force 162 located only 30 miles from the blast. An-
other source of leaks was evident when the AEC's director of
information received a telephone call from a Time reporter
requesting information "about the H-bornb that had just gone
off," within minutes of the blast. (See Voss, Earl H.,
Nuclear Ambush
,
Henry Regnery Co., Chicago, 1963, p. 34, and










theoretical research on such a device as early as 1942, but
work was never allowed to proceed significantly beyond this
point. The responsive decision which followed the 1949
nuclear blast, in retrospect, may well have been very timely
indeed. Apparently from the time they first became convinced
that thermonuclear weapons were feasible, the Soviet Union
appears to have decided to bypass atomic bomb refinement and
72press directly for a thermonuclear device. Existing evidence
indicates that their atomic detonation probably served only
as a necessary prerequisite for hydrogen bomb production.
This is supported by the small number of Soviet nuclear tests
which proceeded the detonation of a thermonuclear device on
August 12, 1953. They had, of course, detonated their first
atomic device on August 29, 1949, but none was detonated in
1950 and only two blasts occurred in 1951<> The next test was
73that of a thermonuclear device in the following year.
On August 8, 1953 Malenkov boasted that "The USA has long
since lost the monopoly in the matter of the production of
72
"After the war, when the feasibility of a hydrogen bomb
was being debated, it was the overwhelming, and in this case,
justified fear that the Russians were already at work in the
area that compelled us to embark on a development program even
before we knew precisely how to go about it." The relatively
close spacing of the Soviet and United States hydrogen deto-
nations and the development of a deliverable bomb, given that
the first Soviet thermonuclear device was more sophisticated
and advanced than the device of the United States indicates
that the Russian scientists started at least as soon as did
the Americans and probably sooner in hydrogen bomb development.
(See Ruina, J. P., "The Nuclear Arms Race: Diagnosis and Treat-
ment," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists
,
Oct. 1968, vol. 24,




' Voss, op . cit.
, pp. xi 1 -xi 11.
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atomic bombs ... The government deems it necessary to report
to the Supreme Soviet that the U. S. has no monopoly in the
production of the hydrogen bomb either." This announcement
was met with great skepticism in the West until four days






The Soviet device appears to have been more plausibly
deliverable than that of the United States. It had used the
"dry" concept of lithium hydride, a necessary requirement for
a deliverable weapon. This allowed them to get away from the
massive refrigeration required of the first American thermo-
nuclear device. (See Quester, op. cit.
,
p. 92, and Chapman,
John L., Atlas: The Story of a Minsii 1 e, Harper and Brothers,
New York, I960, p. 72.)
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IV. TRANSITION TOWARD MUTUAL DESTRUCTION CAPABILITY;
1953-1957
A. THE TRANSITION
In the period 1953-1957 the relationship between the United
States and the Soviet Union underwent a critical transition.
Prior to 1950 their on-again, off-again relationship had
been characterized by each of the two powers probing the
other. The Korean War brought about a re-evaluation of the
threats posed by the adversaries and the beginning of the
reaction decisions which would launch the two super powers
into what has become commonly known as the arms race. The
threat of mutual destruction was to gain real meaning as
thermonuclear weapons came into existence. The year 1953
saw the beginning of a period characterized by intense com-
petition where strategies were revised and resources reallo-
cated to meet the challenges posed in the thermonuclear age.
B. THE NEW ADMINISTRATION OF THE SOVIET UNION
The Soviets had suddenly found themselves under new
administration. On March 5, 1953, Josef Stalin died and this,
at least temporarily, threw the governmental apparatus into
disarray as the Soviet hierarchy maneuvered for position in
the new government e They were now to see another ruler rise
55

to power in the Kremlin—Khrushchev. The new leader was
faced with a party unwilling to accept another dictator.
Thus he consolidated his position by his dynamic leader-
75
ship in manipulating party majorities.
Khrushchev was then able to shift the Soviet grand
strategy, but he did not change the basic objectives of
Soviet foreign policy. The West, in particular the United
States, was still the main enemy, but direct confrontation
had not rendered the desired gains. Khrushchev had ideal-
istically hoped in this period that the Soviet Union could
isolate the West by building a vast alliance system in
x
Nikita Khrushchev assumed the post of First Secretary
of the Communist party on March 14, 1953. Georgii Malenkov
held the position of Premier. In a power struggle which en-
sued Khrushchev eventually won and Malenkov resigned on Feb.
9, 1955. The struggle for leadership evolved around com-
peting philosophies. Malenkov believed the economy should
be oriented more toward consumer goods. Khrushchev believed
it should go more toward military hardware. The later view
prevailed, and Marshal Bulganin replaced Malenkov. From that
time on, even though he lacked any official governmental
position, at that time, Khrushchev grew in power and became
the primary governmental functionary. (See Rosser, op. cit
.
,
p. 28l, Mackintosh, op. cit., pp. 88-89, and Ulam A.B. , Expan-
sion and Coexistance
,
Prager Publishers, New York, 1971, p. 540.)
75In 1957 Khrushchev was able to stand off a challenge
from Malenkov, Molotov, and Kaganovich by getting backing
from the secret police and army. His power position was
solidified to a considerable degree after having successfully




The basic objectives of Soviet foreign policy did not
change with Stalin's death although a different approach was
sought. The primary requirement of that time was to relax
tensions with the West. The next was to seek out a new





Asia, Africa, and Latin America. At the same time the Soviets
77
moved to match the strategic might of their foe.
The Korean War had significantly affected the Soviets. In
particular, the response of the United States to the war served
as a clear indicator that attempts at Soviet expansion were
78to be met with forcible containment. The United States
enjoyed a position of strategic superiority and seemed deter-
mined to retain this distinction. The Soviets, as the chal-
lengers, were obliged to take compensatory measures to match
its strategically stronger competitor. Since the end of
World War II, perceived challenges to the strategic superi-
ority of the United States were met with a strong response.
This characteristic became amplified in the decade of the
fifties and was the character of the interaction aspects of
the strategic relationship between the United States and the
Soviet Union in this period.
C. EISENHOWER'S NEW LOOK
The United States too came under a new administration—one
79
which was to show a clear preference for fiscal economy.
77Ibid
., pp. 290-297, 307.




79The new Republican Administration saw the development
of thermonuclear weapons as the "absolute weapon." The superi-
ority of the United States' strategic arsenal was seen as a
way to cut back on military spending. By maintaining a
destructive nuclear capability the country could relax its






With the new administration the United States began to change
its attitudes toward security. Following the Korean War a
comprehensive review of the nation's strategic position was
made, and alternative approaches to security were analyzed.
In a redefinition of the problem, it was determined that the
threat to the United States was a continuing threat which
so
was two pronged—both military and economic. This redefini-
tion became the Eisenhower "New Look" and stressed a preference
for fiscal economy over those military programs which were
not concerned with the strategic capability of the country.
Where NSC-68 had attempted to provide for balanced mili-
tary forces, the New Look was an attempt to provide a balance
between a strong military and a strong economy. This was
deemed necessary since both would have to remain viable over
the long-haul. Too great a rate of expenditures for defense
might produce inflation and economic ruin. The use of maximum
threat target dates for greatest levels of effort was aban-
doned. The threat was perceived as being continuous, and
expanding efforts to meet some imagined period of maximum
threat would thus be economically damaging. Constant levels
of defense efforts which would not shift with the changing
world political situation were required e The death of Stalin
and the termination of the Korean War has lessened the danger
° Snyder, Glenn H., "The 'New Look' of 1953," in Strategy
,
Politics and Defense Budgets
,
Schilling, Warner R., Hammond,
Paul Y
.
, and Snyder. Glenn H., Columbia University Press, New
York, 1962, p. 383.)
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of all-out war. In an abandonment of the year of maximum
threat, the future danger was not seen as being significantly-
greater than it was v/hen the Eisenhower Administration came
into office.
By mid-1953 the dominant military fact was the overwhelming
nuclear superiority of the United States, in terms of both
number of weapons and delivery systems. The earlier expansion
programs of the Atomic Energy Commission and the Strategic
Air Command were now approaching fruition. NSC-68 had assumed
that stability would be reached when the Soviets acquired a
nuclear delivery system of their own and the West had built
up its conventional forces. The New Look proposed that
stability already existed and had for some time—where the
West lacked one and the Soviets lacked the other. Such a
declaration of faith would then allow the Eisenhower Adminis-
tration to reduce expenditures for conventional forces, and
the economy could relax from a state of permanent, partial
mobilization. The technology of the nuclear age would thus
82provide the means for economy. Against this background
of proposed balance between the economy and security, the








pp. 67 , 74.
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The implementation of the new look began in the spring of
1953. The Truman budget for fiscal year 1954 was reviewed
for possible reduction by the new Administration, which had
83been voted in on a promise to reduce governmental spending.
The Truman budget had requested $41.2 billion for defense.
President Eisenhower considered this excessive and eventually
$4
submitted a request for $35.8 billion. This reduction was
achieved by halting the expansion efforts of the Army and
Navy and by trimming the support forces of all three services.
The ultimate goal of 143 wings for the Air Force by 1956
remained, but the June 30, 1954 interim target was reduced
from 120 wings to 114 wings. Production limitations would
not have allowed for 120 wings, and the budgetary cuts only
85
reflected this limitation. The overall buildup rate of the
Air Force was unchanged, and the President assured the nation
that 60 cents of every defense dollar was being devoted to
air power and air defense.
In May 1953 a study was organized to examine possible
alternatives to existing politico-military policy. Three
83Snyder, "New Look," p. 393.
This figure was further trimmed to $34.5 billion by the
Congress, ( ibid . , p. 396.)




In addition to the Air Force's appropriations, over half
of the Navy's budget was for naval aviation. (See Nov/ York Times
,
May 20, 1953, p. 24.)
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different groups presented briefs advocating: 1. a continua-
tion of the "containment policy," 2. drawing a sharp line
and informing the Soviets that if crossed, they would be
severely punished, 3. a policy of liberation, with vigorous
87programs to "roll back" the Communist sphere of influence.
The purpose of the groups was not to adopt any single position
or develop a synthesis but to examine three quite different
approaches and develop background material for further exam-
ination. The President received the reports in late July and
forwarded them to the Policy Planning Board of the National
Security Council (NSC) with instructions to formulate a basic
policy paper. The NSC, after examining the three reports,
opted for a policy of "containment" with some modifications.
They felt the increased nuclear capability of the United
States would be an important deterrent to Communist expansion
and should be emphasized as should continental defense. It
was further concluded that the Soviets had the capability to
attack the United States, and therefore national security
should take priority over all other policy objectives. The
threat was interpreted as "total" (military and economic) and
continuing, but it was concluded that there was little danger
87
A fourth position was considered briefly: giving the
Soviet Union a deadline for negotiations, and threatening dire
consequences for failure to reach an agreement. This was




of war in the immediate future. This all came together to
make up NSC-162.
The "basic decision" to implement the New Look was pre-
sented by the new Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
Admiral Radford, on October 13, 1953. Its premise was the
"abandonment of the assumption that general "war or large-
scale limited war would be waged without recourse to nuclear
weapons." It was adopted by the NSC and approved by the
President as NSC-162/2 on October 30, 1953. The first
public statement on the new defense concept was made by
Admiral Radford in December of that same year. It received
further definition by Secretary of State Dulles in January,
901954 in his "Massive Retaliation" speech. Given this new
defense philosophy the United States entered an era where
it was much more likely to be pushed into an arms race than
before.
D. THE BOMBER GAP
With the increased reliance on nuclear deterrence by
the United States, the safety of the delivery system became






. , p. 74.
90Perry, Robert L., "The Ballistic Missile Decisions,'
P-3686, Rand Corp., Santa Monica, 1967, p. 11«
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91Soviet turbo-prop bombers. In the May Day Parade flyover in
1954, the appearance of a squadron-sized formation of TU-16
Badgers and a four engine MI-4 Bison (roughly the equivalent
to the B-47 and B-52 respectively) caused quite a fibrilation
of Western hearts. The message was retransmitted on May Day
1955, when Western observers were treated to an "aerial
Ptomkin village" in the form of seven turbo-prop TU-95 Bears,
twelve Bisons, and three plane formations of Badgers totaling
fifty-four aircraft. There were also forty-eight supersonic
MIG-19's and fifty all-weather YAK-25's. 92 The TU-16 threat-
ened the United States overseas base structure, and the TU-95
and the MI-4 were believed capable of striking the continental
United States on a round trip mission.
The Central Intelligence Agency, when asked for the
maximum number of intercontinental bombers the Soviets could
93produce, gave a figure of 15-20 per montho At this time
the B-52 was just entering series production, and at a much
^"T'he aircraft observed were IL-38's, also called "type
31" and TU-200's, the latter being a six-engined turbo-prop.
Sources as authoritative as Aviation Week 's David A. Anderton
were reporting as many as 400 of the two types being based
in Siberia in early 1954. Actually these aircraft were under-
powered and only a few of each were produced. (See Anderton,
David A., "Pictures Reveal Red's New Sunday Punch," Aviation
Week, February 15, 1954, vol. 60, no. 7, p. 12, Quester, op .
cit
.
, p. 128, Kilmarx, op. cit . , p. 252.)
92Aviation Week
,
July 11, 1955, vol. 63, no. 2, p. 13.
93See Dulles, Allen, The Craft of Intelligence , Harper and
Row, Publishers, Inc., New York, 1965, pp. 151-152, and Lee,





94lower rate. The TU-95 and MI-4 had been developed consider-
ably faster than the United States had expected and gave the
appearance of a crash program. If pursued at the maximum rate
believed possible, the Soviets would have some 600 to 700 of
these aircraft by 1959. This would be substantially greater
in number than the 400 B-52's scheduled for production in
the same time period. The result was the first of several
"gap" phenomena in the United States. The "Bomber Gap" was
the result of a willingness on the part of many "civilian
and military leaders" to believe that the Soviets had the
capability and desire to produce large numbers of long-range
95bombers.
The fiscal-minded Republican administration was forced to
disrupt its concept of level defense efforts? The procure-
ment of B-47's had been stretched out and the B-52 program
had been delayed. In 1954 SAC was dependent on overseas
bases to put its B-29's, B-47's, and B-50's in range of the
Soviet Union. The classic Rand study of overseas basing
released in 1954 indicated their increasing vulnerability and
recommended the use of forward basing only for post-strike
96
refueling, if at all. This required a larger tanker fleet,
or7 Green, The World Guide to Combat Planes, Vol. 2
,
p. 34.
95See Bottome, The Balance of Terror
,




96See Wholstetter, A. J., et al, Selection and Use of








so orders for KC-97 s were increased to nearly 900. The
truly optimum bomber would be an intercontinental jet
bomber, so the B-52 production rate was stepped-up begin-
ning in 1955 from 10 to 20 aircraft per month and the overall
goal raised to 59$ aircraft. ' A new jet tanker was ordered,
the first of some 400 KC-135's being delivered SAC in July,
1956. 9^ Development of the SM-62 Snark, a 5000 mile, turbo-
jet powered cruise missile was expedited, and the first
operational unit was formed at the end of 1957.
Two Navy strategic systems achieved initial operational
capability during this period. Both were evolutionary. In
1954, the Regulus I bombardment cruise missile joined the fleet,
and in 1956 the A3D-1, successor to the AJ series entered
operating unitso By 1957 the Regulus I was deployed on two
submarines, ten aircraft carriers and four cruisers. The
Regulus I and its planned successor, Regulus II, both com-
peted for funds with the Polaris missile system. As a result
they were sharply curtailed in 1957. Nevertheless, Regulus I
missiles on five especially configured submarines remained on





Boeing began production of the B-52 at its Wichita plant
in addition to its Seattle plant in 1955. (See Swanborough,
F.G., Combat Aircraft of the World
,
Temple Press Books, London,
1962, pp. 15-16 and Wolfe and Ermarth, op. cit . , p. 48.)
9977Glines, Carroll V., The Modern United States Air Force
,
D. Van Nostrand, Co., Princeton, 1963, p. 61.
Caiden, Martin, The Winded Armada
,
E. P. Dutton and Co.,
New York, 1964, pp. Uh-VtT.
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launching stations from 1959 to 1964. The A3D continued to
serve as a strategic bomber on Navy carriers until the 1960*s.
E. MISSILE DEVELOPMENT IN THE UNITED STATES
At the end of World War II, several noted scientists
counseled the Air Force and Congress not to place any hope on
the success of long range ballistic missiles for many years,
102due to the technological problems involved. Armed with
this advice and a document, Operational Requirements for
Guided Missiles
,
in 1947 the Army cancelled the only United
States long-range ballistic missile project as an economy
103
move. Privately funded research continued at the Convair
*
Aircraft Division of General Dynamics until in January,
1951o The project was revived in the aftermath of NSC-68
and the outbreak of the Korean War (At this time the war-
head would have weighed some 9000 pounds.) This program,
MX-1593 , code named Atlas, was for general research on a
105loosely defined intercontinental ballistic missile.
101The Regulus I grew out of Navy interest in the "Loon,"
developed from the German V-l. Chance-Vought began work on
Regulus in 1948, and it was first flight tested in 1950. (Pao-
lucci, D.A., "The Development of Navy Strategic Offensive and
Defensive Systems," United States Naval Institute Proceedings
,
May 1970, vol. 96, no. 5., pp. 210-213, Green, World Guide to
Combat Planes, vol. 2, pp. 43-45»)
1 02
Adams, op. cit .
,
pp. 9-10, Perry, p. 6 C
103Adams, loc. cit .
#
At that time it was the Consolidated Vultee Aircraft Corp.,
and the Atlas missile was named for the Atlas Corp., the parent









After the United States exploded its first thermonuclear device
on November 1, 1952, the ICBM program was reviewed for possible
acceleration. The Millikan Committee recommended that the
specifications for ICBM's be relaxed, but the program should
not be accelerated until design of the various components
, . . 106
was completed.
The three existing Air Force strategic missile programs
were re-evaluated in the fall of 1953 with the intention of
eliminating any non-productive efforts. The Air Force
Strategic Missiles Evaluation (Teapot) Committee, chaired
by Dr. John von Newmann, recommended that the ICBM program
be expanded and accelerated in the light of the thermonuclear
breakthrougho This would be necessary if the United States
were to prevent "mortal danger" to the nation in the period
1959-1960. The Navaho and Snark, both intercontinental
cruise missiles, were also continued. The Atlas project was
reorganized and given new direction, but there was no crash
107program.
The Millikan Committee was an ad hoc group from the Air
Force Scientific Advisory Board that reviewed the implications
of the successful thermonuclear detonation. The first device
weighed sixty-five tons, so the AEC still had work to do its




E.G., A History of the U.S. Air Force Ballistic Missiles
,
Frederick A. Praeger, Publisher, New York, 1964, p. 08.
107The feasibility of weight reduction in thermonuclear wea-
pons was demonstrated in a laboratory test in the summer of 1953.
In Oct. 1953, von Newmann, wearing his other "hat" as head of
the Air Force nuclear weapons panel confirmed the breakthrough
in size and weight of nuclear weapons. A Rand Corporation study
coincident with the Teapot Committee also expressed the belief
that an ICBM could be operational between 1958-60. Schwiebert,
op. cit .
, pp. 68-73, Chapman, op. cit
.








In 1955 several events occurred which quickened United
States* interest in ballistic missiles. In May and June the
Soviets displayed large new bombers in quantities that defi-
-1 QC?
nitely impressed United States' observers. In July or
August a series of tests of medium and intermediate range
ballistic missiles at Kapustin Yar, northwest Of the Caspian
)r
110
109Sea, were monitored by U. S. radars at Samsun, Turkey. On
November 23, the Soviets air-dropped a thermonuclear device."
With all of the eggs of the United States resting in the
nuclear basket, the relative size and strength of the deter-
Ill
rent force was vital.
The Killian Committee reported to the NSC on February 14,
1955, that the strategic balance would be in jeopardy by the
"early 1960's" and the United States must speed up its missile
108Aviation Week
,
May 23, 1955, op. cit .
,
p. 14, July 11,
1955, op. cit ., p. 13.
109Greenwood, Ted, "Reconnaissance, Surveillance and Arms
Control," The International Institute for Strategic Studies,
London, 1972, pp. 16-17.










programs and begin work on an IRBM. The National Security-
Council then reviewed the entire U. S. ballistic missile
112pxcture.
In May, 1955 design studies for an intermediate range
113ballistic missile were solicited. In October, the Atlas




tracted as a back-up. Two IRB projects, Thor and Jupiter,
were approved in November, 1955.'
The Navy too had exhibited a strong interest in ballistic
missiles, and the Killian Committee stated that "a national
requirement existed for a sea-based ballistic missile."
The Navy endeavored to "buy in" to an existing program, and
112The Technological Capabilities Panel, or Killian Com-
mittee, was established by the NSC at the direction of the
President in the fall of 1954. It evaluated the offensive and
defensive capabilities of both the United States and the Soviet
Union given the recent advances in thermonuclear warhead tech-
nology. The Soviet Blast in August, 1953, and the U.S. deto-
nation on 1 March, 1954, were both "dry" devices. Armacost,
Michael H., The Politics of Weapons Innovation: The Thor-
Jupiter Controversy
,
Columbia University Press, New York, 1969
,
pp. 50-51, Chapman, op. cit ., pp. 72, 74, 84-85.
113Burgess, Eric, Long-Range Ballistic Missiles , The Mac-
Millan Company, New York, 1962, p. 13.
1UIbid, p. 48.
115The IRBM programs were initiated to provide a more
quickly deployable missile than the ICBM, and as a hedge
against the failure of Atlas. Both IRBM's drew heavily on
technology developed in other programs. Thor used many
Atlas components, and Jupiter was a scaled-up version of the





. , p. 16, Bottome, Balance of Terror, pp. 94,
98-99.
116
Sapolsky, Harvey M., The Polaris System Development
,




in November 1955 the Secretary of Defense approved joint
partnership with the Army in the Jupiter program. The Army
missile proved to be patently unsatisfactory for shipboard
use. As soon as Navy solid propellant technology demonstrated
the feasibility of a solid fueled missile, the Navy began to
117
seek a program of its own.
In the summer of 1956 the Chief of Naval Operations
sponsored a National Academy of Science Committee on Undersea
Warfare summer study to examine the "growing Russian submarine
menace." The committee exceded its antisubmarine warfare
charter somewhat by recommending the development of a fleet
of missile-firing submarines based on anticipated technolog-
1 1 $ical developments. After further feasibility studies the
Secretary of Defense approved the Polaris fleet ballistic
missile program on December 8, 1956. In May 1957 it received
119the highest national priority.
Ballistic missile development produced a need for precise
geographic location information that had not previously
existed. Geodetic datum information about the Soviet Union
was inaccurate. In the USSR in 1956 two datums existed that
120






120Gantz, Kenneth F., ed., The United States Air Force
'eport on the Ballistic Missile" Doubleday and Co., Garden
lity, H.Y., 195S, pp. 262-263.
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deficiency and to provide other targeting information, U-2
aircraft began operating over the Soviet Union after June
1 21
1956 in a "unilateral version" of the "open skies" program.
F. SOVIET BALLISTIC MISSILE DEVELOPMENT
The Soviet missile effort had received a gigantic boost
from captured German scientists, hardware, and facilities as
122did the aircraft industry. German scientists and engineers
repatriated in 1951-52 told stories of the development of 120
metric-ton-thrust rocket engines and of Soviet interest in
123250 ton engines. Other stories began to circulate of
Soviet tests of an 800 mile range missile. This information
was given enough credence by the United States for the high
priority installation of an AN/FPS-17 radar at Samsun, Turkey.
This radar was for the express purpose of monitoring Soviet
IRBM/MRBM tests at Kapustin Yar. When this system bacame
operational in the summer of 1955, it disclosed missile
firings at increasingly frequent intervals. On the basis of
"T?he Soviets had rejected Eisenhower's "Open Skies" pro-
posal of 1955 for joint inspection as a disarmament device.
U-2 development had been approved in December, 1954, and it
made its first flight in August, 1955. Quester, op. cit .,
p. 109, Wise, David and Ross, Thomas B., The U-2 'Affair ,
Bantam Books, New York, 1962, pp. 30-31.
122
Lee, Soviet Air and Rocket Forces
,
pp. 148-152.






continued observation it was concluded that the two systems
being tested, SS-3 and SS-4, went into series production in
1956. 12k
In the United States, ballistic missile development did
not proceed at a very rapid pace until after the breakthrough
in warhead size. The Soviets had chosen a different course.
After their initial experiments in rocket engine development,
the Soviets elected to skip the building of a "medium size"
rocket and jumped to very large ones to accommodate their
125
very large warheads. By 1954 the Soviets had frozen the
design of their first ICBM while their state-of-the-art in
thermonuclear technology indicated that a warhead of gigantic
proportions would be required. This was to give them an
initial advantage in the "space race" but would cause future
1 2L
The test pattern changed from irregular firings to a
regular rate of five per month indicating production line
sampling by 1956. Greenwood, op. cit
.
,
p. 16, Aviation Week
,
Feb. 20, 1956, vol. 64, no. 8, p. 2o , Aviation Week, Oct. 20,
1957, vol. 67, no. 16, pp. 26, 27, Wolfe and Ermarth, op. cit .,
p. 268.
125^Adams, op. cit., p. 11, Hilsman, Roger, To Move a Nation ,
Doubleday and Co., New York, 1967, p. 162.
~ Murphy, Charles J. V., "Khrushchev's Paper Bear,"
Fortune, Dec. 1964, vol. 70, no. 6, p. 227.
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127problems as a weapon system. This missile, the SS-6, was
1 2&
first tested in August 1957.
G. STRATEGIC AIR DEFENSE IN THE SOVIET UNION
One of the phenomena which grew out of the Korean
experience was the accelerated expansion of the Strategic
Air Command in the United States. Under Khrushchev and in
the face of hydrogen bomb development, Soviet response to
this came in the form of a major expansion of its strategic
air defenses.
One problem which faced the Soviets was that of coping
with a bomber attack in a high-altitude, all-weather environ-
ment o Korea had shown the vulnerability of the piston
engined bombers, but the United States was then deploying the
faster and higher flying jet B-47's from forward bases ringing
the Soviet Union Q Additionally, the B-52 was then approaching
the operational stage of its development.
To meet the challenges PVO was given added emphasis, and
for the first time in Soviet history was made a separate
127Hilsman, loc. cit.
1 ?$
A frantic search had been conducted in early 1957 by
the U-2's for the Soviet ICM test facility. Other intelli-
gence sources had indicated that a test was approaching before
the site was finally located at Tyura Tarn, 660 miles east of
Kapustin Yar. The Soviets' first ICBM was photographed on
its launch pad by the U-2's and the FPS-17 radar tracked it
in flight. Sputnik I was also observed in this manner. Murphy,




component of the armed forces in late 1954 or early 1955.
It was felt that a new day fighter and an all-weather inter-
ceptor both measurably superior to the MIG-15 and MIG-17
should be developed. Work had long been underway on both the
MIG-19 and the YAK-25 which would fill the interim need. The
YAK-25 made its appearance in 1952, and the MIG-19 proto-
130type flew for the first time in 1953. While both of these
aircraft were credited with some all-weather capability, the
MIG-19 was no improvement over the later models of the MIG-17 's
for all-weather interceptions. This meant it essentially
lacked any such ability. The YAK-25 had better all-weather
performance, but it too fell far short of desired capabilities.
It was produced in numbers only because the Soviet state-of-
the-art was incapable of turning out anything better. The
12°
'The post-Korean War reorganization of the Soviet armed
forces which created the PVO as a separate component marked an
important step in improving its capabilities. As a separate
service PVO now included strategic anti-aircraft artillery,
surface-to-air missiles, radar and ground-observer nets, fighter
divisions with special training in air defense, and other com-
ponents of the Soviet air-defense system. (See Lee, Soviet Air
and Rocket Forces
, pp. 126, 178, and Kilmarx, op. cit . , pp.
265-266.)
130All weather capabilities were almost non-existant in
the Soviet Union until the YAK-25 reached operational squadrons
in 1955. As designed it was intended to intercept such targets
as the Vickers, Valiant, and B-47. Its counterpart the MIG-19
day fighter utilized two axial-flow engines to achieve the
needed power. The Soviet aircraft indiistry still lacked turbo-
jets suitable for fighter aircraft in the 10,000 pound thrust
catagory. Nevertheless, the MIG-19 was a superior fighter to
its predecessors, the MIG-15 and MIG-17. (See Lee, Soviet Air
and Rocket Forces, pp. 141-142, and Green, World Guide to Com-
bat Planes vo.l . on e, pp. 133-134, 178-180.)
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Soviets' inability to produce effective airborne interception
equipment still remained the major stumbling block in this
area.
Notwithstanding, both of these aircraft became operational
131in 1955. At that time efforts were underway for further
development and refinement of fighter-interceptor capabilities.
Development of three new aircraft, the MIG-21 Fishbed, the
SU-7 Fitter, and the SU-9 Fishpot was accelerated. Proto-
types of all three were seen in the June 1956 Tushino Avia-
132tion Day flyover. None of these aircraft was to gain an
operational status until the end of the decade, however.
Only the SU-9 was to have the badly needed but still defi-
133
cient all-weather capability.
By the time the YAK-25 became operational it was con-
sidered obsolete by many western observers. (See Aviation
Week, July 18, 1955, vol. 63, no„ 3, p. 16.)
131Lee, Soviet Air and Rocket Forces
,
p. 142, Green, World
Guide to Combat Planes vol. one
,




132J At this particular air show the Soviets introduced four
new fighters, all except one of which became operational. The
one which failed to reach an operational stage was a non-delta
winged MIG-21. (See Swanborough, op. cit
., pp. 90-91, Green,
World Guide to Combat Planes vol. one
, pp. 136-142, 172-176,
Hot z, R. , "Soviets Show Twining Eight New Planes," Aviation
Week
,
July 2, 1956, vol. 65, no. 1, p. 26, and Aviation Week ,
July 9, 1956, vol. 65, no. 2, pp. 30-32.
133Initial production aircraft of this model had a small
conical radome above the air intake. Later models had the ra-
dome in the center of the air intake. It was designed to ful-
fill the single-seat all-weather interceptor role. (See Taylor,
J.W.R. and Swanborough, G., Military Aircraft of the World,
Charles Scribner's Sons, New York, 1971, p^ 130, Green, The
World Guide to Combat Planes vol. one
,
pp. 175-176, and Swan-







By 1955 "the Soviets possessed a large and still expanding
strategic air defense system. Improvement of the radar screen
surrounding the Soviet Union continued. Given its new autonomy
and upgraded importance PVO had thousands of highly trained
fighter pilots assigned to it and for the first time achieved
some all-weather capability. PVO swelled in size to over half
134
a million personnel by 1956. It had a force of over 10,000
radar-guided anti-aircraft guns, and surface-to-air missile
batteries were increasing in number. More than 20 regional
commands had been established to control the defensive net-
work throughout the Soviet Union. Thousands of day fighters
and all-weather interceptors were committed to the defense of
the homeland. Additionally, construction of an early-warning
135
radar net similar to the DEW Line was undertaken.
Though far from complete the Soviet strategic defensive
system made some major strides forward and constituted a chal-
lenge to the bomber force of SAC for the first time.
1 'Ml
In 1956 there were 550,000 people in Soviet air defense
—
about four times the number engaged in U.S. defenses at that
time. (See Stone, op. cit
.
, p. 91.)
13 5The Soviet air defense system has some 20,000 miles of
border to protect. In an effort to decentralize control and
thus allow individual on-scene commanders to direct defensive
forces as the situation dictates, the Soviets divided the air
defense areas of responsibility up between 20 different commands.
These sectors are irrespective of Army regional commands. (See
Lee, The Soviet Air and Rocket Forces
,






Being more defense minded and faced with a more credible
bomber threat, the Soviets have spent considerably more for air
defense than has the U.S. The best estimates say that the Soviets
have spent, through 1970, about $75 billion, in contrast to $30






As in the United States, work had been underway in the
Soviet Union on a sirface-to-air missile. Efforts to refine
the German made Wasserfall and Rheintochter missiles, captured
in World "War II, now began to bear fruit as the SA-1 and SA-2
missiles finally became operational. By the time PVO was
reorganized a limited number of missile batteries were coming
into service.
One final area of defense bears mention. Commencing in
the mid-1950's the Soviets increased the emphasis placed on
civil defense. This increased attention paralleled the expan-
sion of the PVO programs discussed above and was to carry over
into the next decade. Programs which required lengthy warning
time for mass evacuation of the population continued even
after the advent of the ICBM whose short warning time would
preclude their execution.
H. STRATEGIC AIR DEFENSE IN THE UNITED STATES
Despite policy directives and a critical need for strategic
air defense in the United States, it was grossly inadequate
prior to 1953. There were a number of reasons for its inade-
quacies. As late as 1952 the technological problems of con-
tinental defense seemed insurmountable in light of nuclear
weapons proliferation. Thermonuclear development would only
exacerbate the problem. Secondly, the Korean War placed a
* The SA-1 surface-to-air missiles evidently proved un-
satisfactory as they were only deployed around Moscow. (Seei -ne





higher demand on resources. Not only did the immediate needs
of the war have to be met, but the perceived threat to Europe
drew further from available resources. The threat of attack
to the continental United States still seemed remote. The
tradition and doctrine of the American fighting forces had
long been offensively oriented. The United States had not
been a probable target for attack since the War of 1812. One
final reason for the air defense shortcomings had been the Air
Force opposition, previously discussed. In the early years
of the Korean War they had been far more concerned with the
137build-up of SAC and its offensive roll.
The Eisenhower Administration was to change all this. The
critical decision to reorient the national priorities to in-
clude a vastly expanded and improved air defense system was
made in October 1953 o The Soviet thermonuclear test in August
broke the back of resistance to air defense within the admin-
1 3$istration. The recommendations of the 1952 Summer Study
Group were approved. A commitment was made to reorganize the
137For further explanation as to why air defense had not
previously been built-up to a sufficient level, see Huntington,
op. cit
. , pp. 326-328, and Snyder, "New Look," pp. 420-421.
1 od
It was the Soviet thermonuclear explosion which trig-
gered action on continental defense. Only after the blast did
Administration officials take the steps necessary to address the
problem with specific action solutions. Two weeks after the
Soviet blast, Admiral Radford, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, declared that the Soviet bomb meant that the U.S. must
review and strengthen its air defenses. On Oct. 6, 1953 the NSC
approved NSC-162, the instrument necessary to implement an ef-






continental defenses on an integrated basis and give them
extensive budgetary support. It was this commitment which
marked the turning point for strategic air defense in the
United States.
Radar coverage in the existing defense system had long
been shallow or even nonexistant despite the- earlier deploy-
ment of the Lashup and Permanent systems. In an effort to
expand the radar coverage, the Air Force embarked upon a
"double perimeter" system of two lines of radars to provide
protection for the three most vital areas of the country
—
the Northwest, California, and the Northeast. This entailed
large expansions of the Permanent System. To facilitate its
early operation the Air Force utilized mobile ground radar
units enabling them to have the system fully operational by
1957. This system left low altitude gaps in the radar cover-
age. Therefore the Air Force approved the Gap Filler program
in 1954. This effort was to place some 300 small automatic
139
radar stations between the larger units.
Earlier negotiations secured an agreement with Canada for
the construction of the Pine Tree Line. It was completed in
1955. That same year the United States initiated a crash pro-
gram to construct six new interceptor bases just below the




Modifications of the program delayed its completion, but
it was in operation by 1957. It was not yet fully completed,







As early as 194$ an early-warning line across Canada had
been suggested by air defense planners. In 1952 the Summer
Study Group, an outgrowth of the Charles Report the previous
year, stated the belief that the nation could achieve a strong
air defense posture if given from three to six hours warning
of a pending bomber attack. This amount of warning, it was
concluded, could be obtained through the construction of a
northward early-warning network. They specifically recom-
-i i-i
mended construction of the DEW Line. The Summer Study
Group had estimated its cost to be about $370 million and
called for a crash program which would allow it to be opera-
tional by 1954. The Air Force and the Department of De-
fense did not feel the need for such a program. President
Truman in 1952, however, approved a National Security Council
policy statement calling for its construction. A commitment
in terms of budgetary allocations did not follow until the
next administration. The Eisenhower Administration's endorse-
ment of the Summer Study Group recommendation in late 1953
moved the United States toward the active expansion program
of air defense in the mid-fifties. The desire for an artic
radar warning system finally culminated in an agreement with
Canada in 1954 for construction of the DEW Line. Similar








See Huntington, op. cit
.
,





Lengthy public debates ensued over DEW Line construction,
and some cost estimates went as high as $150 billion for
installation and maintenance. Nevertheless, in 1954 the
Eisenhower Administration made the final decision to build
the DEW Line and construction began early the next year.
This program of construction was accelerated as the same
phenomena which created the "bomber gap" worked to expand
the ADC. •? The DEW Line became operational on August 1,
1957.
Additional impetus for the accelerated construction had
come from the 1954 Rand study, previously discussed, which
discouraged the use of forward bases by United States strategic
bombers. With the B-52 becoming operational in 1955 and flying
from American bases, air defense was further emphasized,
especially the need for early warning.
This meant that closer cooperation between the United
States and Canada was needed. The North American Air Defense
Command (NORAD) was established in September 1957 as a com-
bined U. S. - Canadian Command. It provided the coordination
between the three different early warning networks. Without
1 L.1
such a structure control, would have been very difficult.






'Wolfe and Ermarth, op. cit
., p. 63, and Conant, op. cit .,
p. 16
Conant, op. cit .
1/7See Huntington, op. cit
.
,




Additional coverage was gained by using airborne early-
warning and control aircraft, radar picket ships and the con-
struction of "Texas Towers" some 100 miles off shore between
-1
1 gNew Jersey and Nova Scotia.
By 1954 all ADC Squadrons had received second generation
all-weather fighter-interceptors—F-86D's, F-89D's or F-94C's.
At that time there were some 55 ADC fighter squadrons each
with 25 aircraft. By 1956 the F-102A's and the F-89H's be-
149
came operational with the Falcon air-to-air guided missile.
The Nike-Ajax surface-to-air anti-aircraft missile system
which was started in 1945 had begun to be deployed in 1954.
With the 1953 air defense decision the program had received
150
a high priority rush to get it deployed as rapidly as possible,.
A feasibility study for an anti-ballistic missile system
was completed in October 1956 and stated that the system
looked promising. By September 1957 Nike-Zeus was entering
151the component development stage.
One further attempt at strengthening continental air
defense came out of the 1953 Eisenhower Administration deci-
sion. Lincoln Laboratories had proposed a system which would
See Goldberg, op. cit .
,
p. 136, and Quester, op. cit .
,
p. 102-103.
The Falcon missile (GAR-l) was the first operational air-
to air missile in the Air P'orce. It was extensively deployed
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correlate all air defense data and air defense efforts
—
the Semi-Automatic Ground Environment (SAGE) system.
It was to consist of some twelve command centers located
around the perimeter of the United States. Each command center
would have its own separate computer complex whose function
it was to process, store, and display air surveillance infor-
mation and determine the optimal way to deploy forces against
152
an attack—either fighter aircraft or missile batteries.
The command centers were all connected to NORAD headquarters.
From the beginning SAGE was plagued with computer soft-
wear problems which were never solved, even though SAGE is
still in operation today. By the end of the decade the
introduction of the ICBM had ended its effectiveness. Control
centers were never hardened and the use of a few ICBM's could
effectively allow an unhampered bomber attack to be prosecuted.
In the later years of the Eisenhower Administration SAGE
funding and importance was sharply curtailed when it became
obvious that it would be obsolete before it was ever
153
completed.
152York, op. cit., p. 189.
3t
The number of manhours required for programming of the
SAGE software was underestimated by 6,000 man-years at a time
when there were only about 1000 programmers in the world. The
program was literally never debugged and integrated into the
system. (See Chayes, Abram and Wiesner, J. ed., ABM: An
Evaluation
,




., pp. 155, 189-190.
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V. THE MISSILE GAP: 1957-1961
A. THE BOMBER GAP ENDS
By early 1957 fears of a "bomber gap" began to recede.
The various intelligence agencies had been keeping a close
watch on Soviet aircraft production, and with the initiation
of the U-2 program in 1956, it soon became obvious that Soviet
bomber production was not as great as predicted. The U-2
aircraft had located the heavy bomber factories and their
operational air fields. By actual count output was found
to be modest—well below the production rate of the B-52.
At that point production in the United States was slowed down.
Evidence also indicated the performance of the new Soviet
bomber was less than satisfactory. For that reason the Soviet
leadership apparently decided to limit bomber production,
155
and the "bomber gap" never materialized.
The Soviets built less than 20 percent of the heavy
bombers of which intelligence estimates had said they were
capable of producing. (Bottome, The Balance of Terror
,
p. 41,
Murphy, "Khrushchev s Paper Bear, 1" opT cit., pp. 224-227.
)
155Another hypothesis for the Soviets failure to fully
mobilize their production capacity for bombers is they pro-
duced only those weapons they felt were necessary to deter an
attack by the United States. This theory is not as widely held,
however, and it is generally agreed performance problems were
the primary reason for the limited production of the big







The Soviets only produced about 150 Bisons and 100 Bears,
1 ^6
far short of anticipated numbers. They did ultimately pro-
duce some 1,000 Badgers, but like the B-47, forward basing or
inflight refueling would be required for a long-range strike.
Neither was at hand.
In retrospect it appears that the Soviet Union attempted
to create an illusion of strength to conceal its weakness in
long-range delivery systems. They succeeded all too well.
Their efforts spurred the United States into a massive build-
up of strategic bomber forces. When the "bomber gap" did
appear, it appeared in favor of the United States by about a
157five-to-one ratio.
B. LESSONS NOT LEARNED
From this experience one would expect that the Soviets
would have learned that it was extremely dangerous to escalate
a "paper arms race" because of American sensitivity to threats
to its strategic superiority. Nevertheless, they were to
repeat exactly the same error with exactly the same results.
Thus the myth of the "bomber gap" and its intrinsic fears was
replaced in 1957 by the myth of the "missile gap." The only
difference was that this time the delivery vehicle was the
156Earlier estimates had said the Soviets could produce
about 1,000 of each of the three types of new bombers. Only
the TU-16 Badger was to meet this expectation and it offered
little threat to the U.S. (Quester, op. cit .
,
p. 145, Bottome,
The Balance of Terror, p. 36.)
-i en
? Bottome, The Balance of Terror, p. 36.
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ballistic missile and the result was a fourteen-to-one Soviet
deficit by September 196l. 15
Three events in 1957 led to the "missile gap." These
were the failure of the "bomber gap" to emerge, the successful
launching of a Soviet ICBM, and Sputnik.
The "bomber gap" had produced two effects in the United
States. First it rekindled what might be called a Pearl
Harbor psychosis, whereby the military and civilian leader-
ship was willing to believe the Soviets were intent upon per-
petrating a surprise attack upon the United States with a
soon to be superior intercontinental nuclear bomber force.
Secondly, with this psychological mind-set established, when
the "bomber gap" failed to materialize there was a willingness
to believe it failed to do so because the Soviets were diverting
all their resources to ICBM production in an effort to by-pass
the United States in strategic capabilities.
In August 1957 the Soviets successfully tested the first
ICBM. The United States Air Force had attempted to fire an
Atlas ICBM on June 11 but had failed. 159 On October 4 the
Soviet Union placed the first earth satellite in orbit
—
Sputnik I. This 184 pound orb caused a great deal of public
concern in the United States, but the Eisenhower Administration
158Exact missile numbers for this period differ greatly
among sources. Best estimates credit the U.S. with about 174
strategic missiles targeted on the Soviet Union at a time when
they had fourteen missiles targeted on the U.S. (Bottome, The
Missile Gap
,
Fairleigh Dickinson University Press, Teaneck, N.J.,
1971, p. 232, Greenwood, op. cit . , p. 10.)
^Attempts to flight test Atlas again on Sept. 25 failed.
The first successful flight test of a Series A Atlas missile fin-
ally came on Dec. 17, 1957 after Sputnik I and II were in orbit.
(Schweibert, op. cit., pp. 221-222 )
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refused to be swayed from the existing missile program time-
table or funding. The placing of Sputnik II, a 1120 pound dog-
carrying satellite, in orbit in November that same year could
not be so easily pushed aside. From that point on, and in-
deed as early as October 4 for many, it was commonly held in
the United States that the Russians would mass produce ICBM's,
and would have roughly 1000-1500 intercontinental-range mis-
siles by 1961-1962. The United States would have less than
100 such weapons by that time. In a surprise attack the
-1 /; -1
strategic striking force of the U. S. could be eliminated.
The one-sided missile race was on.
C. MISSILE EFFORTS IN THE UNITED STATES
In February 1954 the Air Force Scientific Advisory Board,
headed by Dr. John von Newmann, had released a report which
was a re-evaluation of many of the assumptions of missile
feasibility. Earlier pessimistic predictions of missile
accuracy and payload requirements were wrong. Missiles would
not have to weigh some 300 tons and be powered by seven engines
162
to carry a nuclear warhead weighing four and one-half tons.
l6 Aviation Week
,
Oct. 14, 1957, vol. 67, no. 15, p. 27,
Aviation Week
,





Weapon estimates of projected Soviet strength varied
greatly as the "missile gap" emerged. Some sources projected
Soviet strength by 196l as low as 150-200 ICBM's while others
were crediting them with as many as 1500. (Bottome, op. cit.
,
p. 40, Phillips, T.R., "The Growing Missile Gap," The Reporter ,
Jan. 8, 1959, vol. 20, no. 1, p. 11, U.S. News and World Report ,
Jan. 23, 196l, vol. 50, no. 4, p. 6o #T"
1 A?
Ilurphy, "America's Widening Military Margin," Fortune
,
August 1957, vol. 56, no. 2, p. 226.
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The von Newmann report had told the Air Force what it wanted
to know: accuracy was improving and a smaller, lighter, and
more powerful warhead could be expected. The improved war-
head was in the form of the "dry bomb" which proved to be the
1 A"3
breakthrough needed if missiles were ever to be practical.
The report served as the necessary catalyst to lift the
Atlas project, the only U. S. ICBM program in existance at
that time, out of research and into development as a weapons
system. The program was still critically short of funds, but
received additional impetus with the successful testing of a
"dry bomb" only a month after the von Neumann report was
released. Nevertheless, in 1954-1955 the budget for
missiles still rested in the millions of dollars while manned
bombers received the lion's share of the appropriations—in
l65the billions of dollars. This was in keeping with the
Eisenhower Administration's concept of a balance between
defense and economy with emphasis on strategic bombers.
Following the Killian report in 1955 (previously discussed)
missile development was vastly expanded and given the highest









The significance of such a priority can be misleading.
This did not necessarily mean that missiles were to receive
boundless funding. It meant that for a given budget, allocation
of funds between missiles and other weapons, missiles would
have first claim on the margin of material or manpower resources






gap," and not until the new Soviet threat manifested itself
with the Russian's successful ICBM test in 1957 was the pat-
tern of funding to be significantly altered.
In October 1955 the Atlas program was accelerated, and
Titan was contracted for as insurance against failure or
unacceptable delay. Prior to 195$ there was never an intent
by the Air Force to deploy more than 100 missiles to opera-
tional sites, and initial deployment of only 20 to 40 missiles
was contemplated. Expense and the vulnerability of such
weapons became an increasing concern to the United States.
These surface stored or surface fired weapons could not with-
stand attack. A less vulnerable system was believed needed
in the next generation of missiles.
In early 1957 President Eisenhower had commissioned a
group to investigate the role of civil defense in overall
United States defense policy. Their conclusions were based
on an analysis of Soviet technological capabilities. In
October 1957 this group, later known as the Gaither Committee
released a report, supported by intelligence estimates,
which predicted that as early as 1959 or early i960 (not the
1961-1962 predicted by the von Neumann Report) the Soviets
could deploy enough ICBM's to destroy the United States'
strategic retaliatory capability.
The barrage of Soviet technological successes in 1957 had
a tremendous psychological impact in the United Statesc





Earlier fears of a Soviet leap into strategic weapons superi-
ority seemed more real. Indeed, one of the von Newmann
assertions had been that the ICBM would guarantee penetration
of any known defense, and in a surprise attack' Soviet tech-
nology might soon allow them to eliminate the bomber force
and any fledgling missile sites in existence. The fears
expressed by the Killian Committee and the Gaither Committee
now seemed all too real.
United States' intelligence had confirmed Khrushchev's
earlier boast that the Soviets had successfully fired an ICBM
over a distance of 4,000 miles, enough to reach the continental
United States. Additionally, intelligence reports confirmed
that the Soviets had fired more than 500 rockets in the 500-
1000 mile range in the preceding two years. From this it was
concluded that Soviet scientists had mastered the fundamentals
of missile technology and that production was already on a
heavy scale.
Though classified "Top Secret," the Gaither Report was
leaked to the public and further stimulated debate on the
"missile gap." Throughout these debates, President Eisenhower
refused to accept the conclusions of the Committee. This only
fortified a belief held by committee members that the




Murphy, Charles J. V., "The White House Since Sputnik,'
Fortune, January 1958, vol. 57, no. 1, p. 99.
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Administration failed to fully appreciate the full extent of
l69the Soviet threat as described by the Pentagon and the CIA. 7
Once leaked the report brought cries from both political
camps that the United States had suffered a severe technological
defeat which had nullified its nuclear advantage and set the
170
country some five years behind the Soviets, Additionally,
Air Force intelligence estimates which bolstered the position
calling for more rapid augmentation of various strategic forces
were made available to Congressional critics of the Adminis-
trations This served to increase the public demand for more
171
of the expensive and already obsolete liquid-fueled missiles.
Throughout the debates the President stood his ground, re-
fusing to accelerate missile programs beyond their present
stage, always claiming to have access to different intelli-
gence information.
In July 1959 the then Secretary of Defense, Neil McElroy,
told Congress that a "missile gap" did in fact exist as
Administration critics claimed, and a three-to-one Soviet
advantage would exist by 196l. He further stated, however,
169President Eisenhower admitted this report indicated the
retaliatory forces of the United States would become vulnerable
by 1959, but rejected this saying he had "other information."
(Bottome, The Balance of Terror
,
p. 46, Bottome, The Missile
Gap
,
p. Ul~, Halperin, M.H. , The Gaither Committee and the
Policy Process," World Politics, April 196l, vol. 13, no. 3,
p. 364.)
170Murphy, "The White House Since Sputnik," op. cit.
,
p. 100.
171 Quester, op. cit .






that the United States had an ample deterrent to any attack
—
the standard Administration answer to its "missile gap"
172
critics.
It had been determined that the first-generation liquid-
fueled ICBM's were too large, expensive, and slow to react to
be efficiently utilized if mass produced. The decision had
been made to produce only a limited number of these missiles
while awaiting a development of the far more promising second-
generation ICBM's. In the interim the main thrust of United
States' nuclear deterrent would still have to come from
strategic bombers.
Anticipated technological achievement and the cost of the
first-generation missiles inspired a third major interconti-
173
nental ballistic missile system—Minuteman. Minuteman I
and Polaris, (previously discussed) were developed almost in
parallel after Navy solid fuel technology demonstrated the
feasibility of solid-fuel missiles. The Polaris crash program
began in January 1957, and Minuteman I followed in February
1953.m
The Navy's program was never in serious doubt, but Minute-
man I development competed for funds with Atlas, Titan I, and
172The transcript of these hearings were never made public,
but the Secretary of Defense apparently did make such a state-
ment even though Administration policy rejected the existance







17 3Minuteman was the first Air Force missile to exploit fully
the advances made in miniaturization and solid fuel technology.
(Perry, op . c i t
.
, pp. 18-13.)






Thor. Before Sputnik, Minuteman I could have been developed
only at the price of eliminating one or more of the liquid-
175fueled missile programs. The advantages offered by the
solid-fuel missile would have probably overcome this obstacle
without the Sputnik scare factor. Minuteman I was much less
expensive than either Atlas or Titan I, and its smaller size
made it easily adaptable to hardened site deployment. This
meant it offered a reliable second strike capability. Addi-
tionally, its solid-fuel propellant gave it a quick reaction
time.
Minuteman I had one disadvantage which was common to all
ICBM's of that period. It had no retargeting capability.
Because of the inability of the onboard computer to accept
more than one target, Minuteman I's target information could
not be readily changed to take advantage of knowledge of
earlier firing malfunctions.
Sputnik made any argument against Minuteman I academic.
In the outcry that followed, Administration resistance dis-
appeared, and the approval of the new missile did not mean the







fact, Atlas, Titan I, and Thor, all in production, were
accelerated. The same was true for the developmental programs
of Minuteman I, Polaris, and Titan II.
Under the accelerated programs the first twenty-seven Atlas
D's entered service in 1959. Twenty-seven more of the follow-
on Atlas E's, a hardened version of the "D" model, were in
service by the early sixties. Fifty-four "F" model Atlas mis-
siles were deployed in 1963. The Titan I missile became
operational in April 1962, and fifty-four were deployed. Its
successor, the Titan II, became operational in 1963 and fifty-
four of these missiles were deployed. Titan II was eventually
the only liquid-fueled missile to remain operational after
Minuteman deployment began.
In 195$ the Air Force planned to deploy some 400 Minute-
men as they began entering service in 196l. Two years later
the number had risen to S00 planned by 1962. Plans eventually
called for 1300 Minuteman missiles to be deployed by fiscal
year 1966. The Joint Chiefs of Staff had recommended as many
*Titan II was in the "Study Stage" in 1957. Like Titan
I it was to be deployed in hardened sites. Unlike Titan I
though, Titan II was to be fired from within the silo and
not first elevated to the surface. The sites were hardened
to 100 psi, the same as the first Minuteman sites. Arguments
that Minuteman I could do the same job at far less cost were
rejected because Titan II could carry a much larger payload.
Development continued, and the missile became operational in
June 1963. (Schwiebert, op. cit .
,
p. 122.)
The earlier Atlas and Titan models were scheduled to be





as 3000 of the missiles, but only 1000 Minutemen were
177
eventually deployed.
Believing that a "missile gap" would exist, the first
order of business had been to get a workable IRBM deployed
until ICBM's became available—thus, Thor and Jupiter. Both
missiles were fallouts of existing missile programs, and it
was planned to deploy about 1000 of these IRBM's to Europe for
NATO forces as they became available. Thor became operational
on September 19, 1958 and was immediately deployed to the
United Kingdom, and Jupiter was deployed to Italy and Turkey
in 1959. 178
The acceptance of these 1500 mile-range missiles by the
NATO allies was considered sufficient to deter any Soviet
threat at least until ICBM's went into place. Intelligence
estimates continued to reduce the expected number of Soviet
ICBM's and to move their operational date back. Thus, there
was no attempt to install IRBM's in other than these three
countries. Even though these missiles were obsolete, inaccurate,
and very vulnerable they adequately served their purpose and
, 179
remained until 1962.
177Secretary of Defense McNamara considered 1,000 Minuteman
missiles more than necessary, but the smallest figure politi-
cally acceptable in the face of a Joint Chiefs recommendation
of 3,000. (Tammen, Ronald L., MIRV and the Arms Race, Praeger





p. 3$, Wolfe and Ermarth, op. cj t
.
,
p. 55, Armacost, op. cit . , p. 202.
"^Hilsman, op. cit ., p. 202-203.
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D. BOMBER PROCUREMENT IN THE MISSILE GAP
The acceleration of missile programs was not the only-
United States reaction to the "missile gap." The Air Force
received about forty-five percent of the total military
1 $0budget from fiscal year 1955-1959. Of this, a sizeable
portion went to the bomber command" who, even though the
"bomber gap" myth had long been dispelled, were still urging
greater acquisitions of B-52 s and the new B-58 bombers.
The Air Force took delivery of nearly 500 E, F, G, and
H model B-52's between October 1957, and June 1962. X Of
these, the G and H models were equipped with more effective
penetration aids and designed to carry the Hound Dog missile,
a subsonic, air-breathing, cruise missile with a range of
about 700 miles.
In December 1957 the contract for the B-70 was let as a
follow on to the B-52. It was to have speed of 2300 miles
per hour and an altitude capability of 70,000 to 75,000 feet.
The concept was never bought, and it was canceled as a weapon
1 $0




The high speed B-58 was an outgrowth of the "bomber gap."
The decision to develop it came after U. S. officials observed




p. 47, Aviation Week, May 24, 1954, vol. 60, no. 21, p. 13.)
In all, 744 of these aircraft were procured. (Green,
op. cit
.
, vol. 2, pp. 34-36, Stone, op. cit . , p. 78.)
Hound Dog was developed after U-2 photography had shown
massive air defenses surrounding Soviet targets. The missile
became operational in I960. (Swanborough, op. cit.
, p. 16, and
"Military Balance 1968-1969," p. 28.)
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system in 1959. Production of two prototypes continued, but
1 dp
the aircraft never became operational,
E. RECONNAISSANCE EFFORT IN THE UNITED STATES
In the year following Sputnik a contract was let for a
high-speed follow-on to the U-2—the SR-71. First flown in
I960, this Mach 3 aircraft could cruise at 100,000 feet, but
still could not provide all of the reconnaissance coverage
deemed necessary. In March 1955 the Air Force, under CIA
sponsorship, had issued requirements for a reconnaissance
satellite designated WS-117L. The contract for its Agena
self-powered satellite vehicle was awarded to Lockheed in
1956. Agena was then coupled to a Thor missile for testing
in the "Discoverer" series. The project did not meet with
success until Discoverer 13. The next vehicle, Discoverer
14, was recovered on August 19, I960, and produced the first
satellite pictures of the Soviet Union. This was only three
months after Powers was shot down deep inside the Soviet Union.
1 $"?
Reconnaissance coverage continued almost uninterrupted.
Two more Discoverer satellites were recovered in i960. A
radio-transmission camera system redesignated SAMOS (Satellite










entered a polar orbit on January 31, 196l. Within a few days
SAMOS II provided full coverage of the Soviet Union. ^
F. BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE
In 1957 Congress had authorized the Air Force to develop
a missile detection system, and a contract was let in January
1958. The Ballistic Missile Early Warning System (BMEWS) was
ultimately to consist of three radar sites at Clear, Alaska,
185Thule, Greenland, and the Fylingdale's Moor, England. ?
The Thule site became operational in December I960, and
the Clear, Alaska site was operational in September 196l.
The third site at Fylingdales, England went into operation in
September 1963 . The three-thousand mile range of BMEWS radar
does not provide full coverage of the Soviet Union, but does
afford early warning of Soviet ICBM launchings and has pro-
186
vided significant data on Soviet missile tests.
The Nike-Zeus, an antiballistic missile program, had been
initiated by the Army in 1956. It was a straightforward attempt
to use existing technology for the design of a nuclear-armed
187
rocket for the purpose of intercepting incoming warheads.
Nike-Zeus essentially died in 1959, but careful review on a
year-by-year basis always resulted in a determination to
^Ibid.
l85Englebardt, S. L., Strategic Defenses , Thomas Y. Crowell
Co., New York, 1966, pp. 107-108, 110.





1 7York, op. cit ., p. 193.
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continue with research and development. The program was
revised in 196l as Nike-X and eventually grew into Sentinal,
and finally, Safeguard.
G. SOVIET EFFORTS TO BUILD A MYTH
The predominant view held in the United States in late 1957
was that the new Soviet rocket force had a counterforce doctrine
which was intended to one day catch the entire SAC bomber
force on the ground. A devastating Pearl Harbor-type grand
first strike could thus decisively defeat the United States.
The actions taken by the United States after Sputnik would
undoubtedly rule out such a plan if in fact it ever existed.
Nevertheless, Soviet claims of tremendous missile achievement
continued to foster the wide-spread belief in the United States
of a menacing threat posed by Soviet missiles. Irrefutable
evidence of Soviet successes coupled with an ever increasing
tendency on the part of Khrushchev to boast of Soviet missile
prowess moved the United States from the "bomber gap" into
the "missile gap."
Only three days after Sputnik I, Khrushchev told James
Reston of the New York Times, "We now have all the rockets we




short-range rockets." After Sputnik II Khrushchev became
even more verbose. At a reception of All-Union Congress of
Soviet Journalists he boasted that if attacked, the Soviet
Union could "wipe our potential enemies off the face of the
earth." He further stated that he had recently visited a
plant which had in one year produced "250 rockets with hydrogen
189
warheads." He also informed William R. Hearst, Jr. that
"the Soviet Union has intercontinental ballistic rockets with
hydrogen warheads," and further bragged to Hearst that they
had a stockpile of at least twenty ICBM's with nuclear war-
190heads ready for launch at any given minute. To give
credence to some of what now might seem to be wild, irrespon-
sible statements, Khrushchev boasted of the power of Soviet
rockets, stating they could "double or more than double the
weight of the satellite, because the Soviet intercontinental
rocket has tremendous power . . . ." On January 26, 1958,
188This statement was considered important because of Its
reference to sufficiency in all three types of missiles but
not numbers of any specific type. Khrushchev's early state-
ments on Soviet space successes, while exuberant, were con-
trolled and ambiguous, meant to communicate misleading hints
about Soviet strength. This was the pattern followed for the
remainder of the decade. (Horelick, A.L., and Rush, M.
,






189Khrushchev openly stated missiles were being mass pro-
duced on a production line basis as early as 1957. With 250
rockets produced at a single plant in one year the obvious im-
plication was that there was a sizeable stockpile of these wea-
pons at a time when the U.S. first deployed strategic ballistic
missile, Thor, was still a year away. ( Aviation Week , Nov. 30,
1959, vol. 71, no. 18, p. 34.)
190Horelick and Rush, op. cit ., pp. 65, 67068.
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he was proven to be right when a 2925 pound Sputnik III went
into orbit.
Given the obvious Soviet technology in the field, backed
up by these exorbitant claims, it is easy to see why the
United States public could so easily believe a "missile gap"
existed. What is not so obvious is why the Soviets, still
smarting from the results of similar, irresponsible bomber
propaganda campaign, would so willingly launch another such
program. It is possible that the initial Soviet missile-
space successes and United States' failure had encouraged
the Soviet leadership to believe such a disparity really did
exist and would for some time to come. The sanctioning of
large increases in Soviet research and development expendi-
tures in 19 5$ could have manifested a convention that tech-
nological momentum thus acquired could be converted into
concrete advantage before a significant response could be
192generated in the United States.
A more generally accepted explanation holds that the
Soviet claims and tests were intended to project a general
191
In addition to the obvious advantage accrued to the
Soviets in launching the first satellite, Khrushchev attempted
to establish satellite weight as the criterion for establishing
power in the missile race. ( Ibid .
, pp. 66-67.)
192The importance of projecting the image of missile superi-
ority whereby space spectaculars took presidence over military
requirements was paramount. This approach caused considerable
contention between military planners who did not v/ant "to hand
over their precious rockets for launching sputniks" and those
carrying out Khrushchev's injunction to devote available re-
sources to getting a man into space first (Wolfe and Ermarth,
op. cit
., pp. 52n, 53n, 53.)
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impression of power where none really existed. Khrushchev
possibly felt that political profit could be derived from the
image of Soviet missile power before such power was actually
acquired. The Soviet bomber program's failure to substantially
improve their intercontinental delivery capability strongly
supports this latter hypothesis. As has historically been
the case the Soviets totally disregarded the possible impact
this approach might have on the American public and govern-
mental decision makers.
Unlike the United States who developed a small warhead
before developing a missile to carry it, the Soviets built
193their initial missiles around their existing large warheads.
As a result, the SS-6, the Soviets' first ICBM, proved to be
much too heavy to be dispersed away from the Trans-Siberian
railroad, needed to transport and service it, or to be put
underground in protective silos. Additionally, the missile
was tremendously expensive. It utilized a very unstable
liquid propellent making it impossible to maintain in any
19A-
state of readiness. The huge booster rocket offered a
distinct advantage, however, in lofting heavy payloads into
space.
Monitoring efforts by the United States indicated that









infrequent and increasingly sporadic, indicating the Soviets
had encountered technical problems. By 195$ Defense Department
officials had begun to slip back the estimated date on which
195the SS-6 would become operational. These first generation
missiles were cumbersome and expensive, and for that reason
the Soviets appear to have made the decision in 1958 or 1959
to limit production of the SS-6. Like the United States, the
Soviets decided not to produce this missile in quantity but
rather to proceed with the development of second generation
196
missiles. Despite the alarm which the SS-6 caused in the
, 197West, it did not become operational until about I960.
Earlier intelligence estimates had predicted as many as 1500
Soviet ICBM's, but by that date they had only 14 of the big
• •, • i 198missiles in place.
19 5Seven squadrons of Thor and Jupiter missiles were pro-
duced for overseas deployment. These missiles were eventually
to be deployed in Alaska, Okinawa, Guam, Formosa, and the Philip-
pines in addition to those sites in Europe. Intelligence reports
indicated Soviet missile programs were not progressing as rap-
idly as exaggerated estimates had indicated. When estimates
of the operational date of Soviet missiles had slipped from
six months to a year the urgency of placing interim ICBM's in
overseas bases subsided. In October 1959 the United States
announced there would be no further Thor or Jupiter overseas
bases. (Armacost, op. cit .
, pp. 212-215.)
19 Bottome, The Missile Gap, p. 77n.
197Wolfe and Ermarth, op. cit
. ,




In September 1961 estimates credited the Soviet Union
with 14 ICBM's. This came after further evaluation of SAMOS
II pictures and recovery of several subsequent Discoverer
capsules. (Greenwood, op. cit., p c 10.)
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From 1956 to i960, the United States conducted some thirty
199deep penetration U-2 flights into the Soviet Union. 77 The
same photography which had conclusively ended the "bomber gap"
served to dispell much of the fear of a "missile gap." Photo-
graphy consistantly showed fewer deployed Soviet missiles
than had been expected and brought about a continual down-
grading of estimated Soviet missile strength. In December
1959, the United States and the Soviet Union each had only
201
about ten combat-ready ICBM's.
Gary Powers and his U-2 were downed on May 1, I960, and
aerial intelligence gathering was temporarily halted. Earlier
that same year, Khrushchev had intimated that the Soviets
were well aware of the U-2 flights, but that U-2's had not
flown over areas where the Soviet ICBM's were located. He
further stated that the mammoth SS-6 was easily camouflaged
and could avoid detection even if overflown. These claims
202
were repeated after the downing of the U-2.
SAMOS II was launched in 196l and began its satellite
inspection of the Soviet Union. Six days later the new
Secretary of Defense, McNamara, ended any remaining vestige








Horelick and Rush, op. cit
., p. 98.
202Ibid., pp. 99, 115.
10/,

of official "missile gap" doubt when he told the press that
203
evidence now revealed that no "missile gap" existed. The
vulnerable SS-6*s previously pinpointed by the U-2 overflights
had proven to be the entire arsenal of ICBM missiles.
The Soviets appear to have produced only about four per-
cent of the ICBM's intelligence sources estimated they were
capable of building. 20/f By the fall of 196l, the United
States began to express strong confidence in its superiority
in the missile field, and Khrushchev had long since ceased
205
claiming overall military superiority. ' A "missile gap"
truly existed then, but as in the case of their ill-fated
"bomber gap" projection, it was the Soviets who faced the
numerical disadvantage.
203^ Greenwood, op. cit
., p. 10.
20/fBottome, The Balance of Terror
, p. 41.
205Khrushchev now talked about the "necessary" quantity
of nuclear bombs but said nothing about the quantity of
rockets available, only that they were the world's most






VI. SUMMARY OF STRATEGIC INTERACTIONS
The period 1945 through 1961 is one of periodic, intense,
bipolar competition between the United States and the Soviet
Union. It was characterized by the Soviets working from a
position of strategic inferiority and taking compensatory
actions which were seen as challenges to the strategic superi-
ority of the United States. The United States in return, con-
sistantly reacted in an almost paranoaic manner to such
challenges. Interactions were exacerbated by what appears,
in retrospect, to have been irresponsible threats and boasting
by Soviet leaders about nonexistant weapons in their arsenal.
These statements were generally backed up by just enough
tangible evidence to make such claims appear to be possible.
Issues were further clouded by Soviet secrecy which made
their strategic capabilities and intentions a great uncertainty
to the West. It was never possible to tell whether the
Soviets were moving toward supremacy or simply a position of
deterrence. Additionally, the Soviet leadership never fully
appreciated the extreme dangers in pursuing any strategic
arms escalation given the American sensitivity to possible
threats to its position of strategic superiority.
Each of the four periods discussed between 1945 and 1961
represents a time in which either a major event such as the
Korean War in the 1949-1953 period or some major strategic




In the first period from 1945 to 1949 there can be little
doubt that the Soviets were determined to have nuclear weapons
and break the nuclear monopoly of the United States. The
sizeable lead enjoyed by the United States in nuclear tech-
nology had a tremendous influence on their decision. The
"coincidental" timing of Western and corresponding Soviet
actions, such as the successful chain reaction experiments
at the University of Chicago in 1942 followed shortly by a
rejuvinated Soviet research program seem to go beyond mere
happenstance. The order to accelerate the Soviet developmental
program following the Alamogordo test, and the eventual arrest
of Soviet nuclear scientists for failing to achieve sufficient
results all point to the tremendous influence the program in
the United States had on Soviet nuclear development. This
ultimately proves to be one of the more classic cases of a
response to a major technological breakthrough with impetus
coming as the direct result of nuclear weapons development
in the West.
Parallel development of a long-range bomber force and
nuclear weapons was a clear indication of their intent. The
influence of the United States and the urgency felt by the
Soviets in this period is further exemplified by their liberal
"borrowing" from Western technology. The case of the TU-4
reproduction of the B—29 i the need to utilize the British-
made Rolls Hoyce engines in the MIG-15, and the heavy reliance
upon captured German technicians and technology in their early
air defense and jet engine development efforts illustrate this.
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Despite the fact that they were almost totally lacking in
tactical experience, facilities, and technical expertise, a
major portion of their postwar economy was directed at acquiring
a strategic bomber force. Their goal was a bomber force
which, if not equal to that of the United States, was of
sufficient strength to pose a serious threat to Western
Europe and counter the American presence there.
In the area of air defenses, the nuclear monopoly of the
United States combined with the delivery potential of its
strategic bomber force to pose a substantial threat to the
Soviet Union. From the outset the Soviets responded directly
to this threat. Their massive postwar air defense efforts
are an even more glaring and one sided example of a reaction
to a posed threat. The Soviet: *s initial efforts to remedy
shortcomings in air defense of the homeland were tremendous.
Competitive aircraft design programs yielded the famed
MIG-15, built in massive quantity to meet the interceptor
needs. Extensive efforts were exerted to advance the Soviet
expertise in the field of electronics, producing their own
early warning and tracking radars by the early fifties
—
both deemed essential in the face of the United States'
nuclear strike force.
For the most part, the United States did not react with
the decisiveness of the Soviet Union, but react it did. SAC
was formed in 1946. It was expanded in 1947, but no major
impetus was gained until a series of political crises in
1948 brought about a fear of imminent war. Early 1949 saw
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SAC reach a new high for this period with 21 bombardment groups,
but the "buy" decisions for SAC in this period were not di-
rected at matching or countering any Soviet weapons system.
The United States* air defense system decisions were only
slightly different, at least until late in the postwar period.
Virtually no air defense existed prior to 194$. Even though
there was an Air Defense Command, it lacked substance. The
few early warning radar stations it had at its disposal were
in operation only on a part time basis. Once again the poli-
tical situation was the driving force behind its 194$ expan-
sion, (it should be remembered that the TU-4 could not reach
the continental United States on a roundtrip mission.) Not
until after the Soviets acquired nuclear weapons did the
United States enter into a hardware action-reaction arms
race.
1949-1953
The Soviet nuclear blast on August 29, 1949 signaled the
end of the nuclear monopoly era and ushered in a new period
—
one which would be dominated by the Korean War. This period
represented a time of substantial change within both the
United States and the Soviet Union. In the context of weapons
interaction there is little question that the Soviet nuclear
detonation triggered a rapid and large-scaled reaction in the
United States.
Detection of the Soviet blast brought about the first
three U. S. responses to the development of a Soviet strategic
weapon. There was an almost instantaneous call, initiated
by Admiral Strauss, for work to begin on the development of a
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"Super" or hydrogen bomb. Shortly thereafter a group began a
strategic appraisal based on present commitments and the
existing strategic situation. Their report, NSC-68, defined
a continuing military and economic threat. Finally, the
deterrent muscle of SAC was expanded with Congressional
appropriations and authorization for the purchase of 155 more
B-36 intercontinental bombers.
By early 1950 the effects of these three reactive initia-
tives had begun to manifest themselves. The H-bomb decision
had been announced by President Trumna in January, by March
NSC-68 was published, and the necessary budgetary recommenda-
tions were being processed. SAC continued to expand as more
B-36*s and B-50's were delivered.
Efforts were still relatively low keyed and had not yet
gained real momentum, if they ever really would have, when
the Soviet-engineered attack on South Korea came. This
attack exacerbated the slow moving programs in the same
manner as had the 1948 political crises and spurred the
United States into a massive rebuilding program. The
developmental program of the "Super" did not experience the
acceleration of the other programs because of its long lead
time requirements and relative infancy, but the Korean con-
flict did serve to silence many of its critics. NSC-68 was
then taken very seriously, and on its recommendations, Con-
gress expanded defense spending by more than a threefold
increase. SAC received even more emphasis as the primary
deterrent force, and subsequent studies recommended the
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development of a massive, three-tiered radar early warning and
interception system to assure its protection.
For the most part the Soviet Union did not respond to
the expansion or development of new weapons in the United
States in this period beyond the continuation of previously
initiated programs in air defense and bomber development.
One might well argue that the Soviet hydrogen bomb develop-
ment was in response to the announced intentions of the United
States to develop the "Super." Existing information and
historical fact simply cannot support such a thesis, however.
They detonated an advanced device relatively early and
developed a deliverable weapon ahead of the United States.
Only three nuclear tests preceded their first thermonuclear
detonation which lends strong credence to the belief that
they had made a very early decision to strive for such a
weapon.
Technological advances within the Soviet Union allowed
for the development of an effective but very thin early
warning system in the eastern portion of the country. This
was little more than an expansion of the 1946-initiated radar
air defense system. Jet engine development led to better
point-defense fighters, and made possible the Soviets' first
truly intercontinental bombers. The increased emphasis in
bomber development probably came more as a result of the
Soviets acquiring a nuclear capability of their own and the
need to have some means of delivery, than because of some
action initiated by the United States.
Ill

This period was characterized by an apparent reversal of
the interaction roles from the earlier 1945-1949 period with
the United States reacting to Soviet developments at a time
when the Soviets seemed to react little to U.S. developments.
The reactions of the United States were then accelerated by-
political outgrowths of the Korean War.
1953-1957
Both powers came out of the Korean War significantly-
effected. It was this experience which caused the lines of
the Cold "War to be more sharply drawn as the intense bipolar
competition which characterized the period began.
The Eisenhower Administration placed new emphasis on the
economy and slowed or halted those military programs concerned
with conventional force build-up c President Eisenhower's
New Look policy stressed the need for a balance between a
strong military and a strong economy. But after the Soviet
thermonuclear blast on August 12,. 1953, the National Security
Council gave the New Look explicit direction through NSC-162/2
and its resulting policy of massive retaliation.
While NSC-162/2 may have received emphasis with the
Soviet thermonuclear explosion, the driving force for its
adoption still remained an intense desire on the part of the
new administration to strengthen the economy. It was felt
this could be achieved by cutting conventional force funding
to the bone and relying almost totally on a nuclear deterrent.
A more positive reaction to the Soviet hydrogen device
was to manifest itself in air defense efforts in the United
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States. In early 1953 authoritative sources were crediting
the Soviets with a quantity of new long-range bombers, the
TU-200 and the IL-3&. Even though these reports later proved
to be erroneous they served to alarm air defense advocates.
This alarm was then shared by others when the Soviets detonated
their first thermonuclear device that same year.
United States fears that it was losing its immunity to
nuclear attack and the Soviet thermonuclear achievement caused
programs which had been discussed but not funded to receive
the necessary budgetary support. Work quickly began on the
three-tiered radar early-warning system deemed necessary to
give adequate warning of a pending bomber attack. This pro-
gram was accelerated because of a later Soviet bomber build-up
projection, and interim programs were initiated to fill short
term radar coverage needs.
While this was obviously a reaction to a perceived Soviet
bomber threat the air defense program in the United States
never took on the magnitude of its counterpart in the Soviet
Union. It was the greatest reaction by the United States
to this date.
By 1953 three other new Soviet bombers were in production.
The 141
-4 Bison and the TU-95 Bear were both considered to be
long-ranged bombers c The TU-16 Badger was credited with a
medium range capability comparable to that of the B-47o These
aircraft all appeared in numbers in the 1954-1955 May Day Parade
fly-overs, some two years ahead of their estimated schedule.
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Intelligence estimates of Soviet bomber production capa-
bility caused United States planners to conclude that a
"bomber gap" would soon exist unless immediate, remedial
measures were taken. In response a massive B-52 and KC-135
tanker production program was initiated. The perceived threat
to American strategic superiority upon which deterrence of
the Soviet Union depended had been countered.
In this first of several gap phenomena of the fifties,
the United States overreacted—a pattern which was to be
followed again and would only serve to widen the true disparity
already in existence. This was uniformly to the disadvantage
of the Soviet Union.
With the beginning of the "bomber gap" experience in 1954-
1955 the United States also accelerated existing missile pro-
grams and created others. Thor and Jupiter IRBM development
began as did the Titan ICBM program, a back up for Atlas. In
1955 the Killian Committee reported that the strategic balance
would be in jeopardy by the "early 1960's" if the United States
missile program was not accelerated. Also in 1955 an exten-
sive series of IRBM tests was begun in the Soviet Union and
monitored by the United States. Shortly thereafter the
Soviets detonated their first air-dropped thermonuclear weapon,
and it appeared the predictions of the Killian Committee might
be running well ahead of schedule.
Although missile research and development had long been
underway it had only just started reaching the feasibility
stage in the mid-fifties, therefore, technological drive alone
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could not begin to account for the reaction of the United
States. Seeing a Soviet threat, the immediate reaction was
to accelerate the one existing ICBM program, provide it with
a back-up, and made an all out effort to get something out
immediately. Thus, Thor and Jupiter were only interim fills
with state-of-the-art technology. This is another example
of the response which rapidly became characteristic of the
United States when faced with a challenge to its strategic
superiority.
In the aftermath of the Korean War the new Soviet regime
faced many difficult problems. Aside from the domestic
power struggle which ensued following Stalin's death, the
Korean War had brought about a rapid expansion of SAC in the
United States. In response to the growing air defense needs.
PVO was made a separate service. A clear indication of the
perceived threat imposed by SAC was the tremendous alloca-
tions of resources to PVO in this period—over half a million
men and eventually $75 billion. Additionally, efforts to
acquire a good all-weather interceptor and a day fighter
superior to the MIG-15 and MIG-17 were accelerated.
The expansion of SAC when coupled with the development of
a hydrogen device clearly gave a renewed emphasis to Soviet
air defense efforts. Even in the absence of thermonuclear
weapons PVO expansion on the magnitude experienced would
probably have occured. The Korean War had shown the vulner-
ability of the piston-driven bomber, but the deployment of
the B-47 to forward bases made much of the old air defense
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system and concepts obsolete. Changes were essential to keep
pace with technology. Nevertheless, there can be little doubt
that the expansion of SAC was the driving force behind the re-
organization of PVO and the reallocation of resources to it in
an effort to upgrade the Soviet air defense system.
Bomber development in this time frame showed a considerably
less causal relationship than did air defense. While evidence
strongly suggests that the Soviet Union undertook a crash
bomber developmental program, it is doubtful that it did so
to counter the expansion of SAC. More likely the impetus
came from nuclear weapons development and a technological
break-through in jet engine design in the Soviet Union. With
a deliverable nuclear weapon and the promise of a thermo-
nuclear weapon, engine technology finally provided an adequate
means for delivery,. If the Soviets were to have a credible
nuclear deterrent of their own, it was imperative that they
develop a delivery system capable of constituting a valid
threat. Such development was given a very high priority.
The same might be said about Soviet missile development.
Soviet interest in missile development roughly paralleled
that of the United States. As with the bombers, evidence
indicates that the IRBM and the MRBM developmental programs
were probably given a crash priority. At the height of their
early testing, they were firing five missiles a month and
were in series production of the SS-3 and SS-4 in 1956.
These missiles constituted no threat to the continental
United States but their deployment threatened Western Europe
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and the overseas SAC bases. Additionally only the medium
ranged TU-16 was ever produced in significant number, and it
too was incapable of reaching the United States, Given that
both of these weapon systems were deployed against Europe and
once deployed the Soviets began to cut back conventional
forces, it became clear that Europe was still the hostage to
be used to deter the United States.
While this marked a change in Soviet strategy—nuclear
deterrence vice conventional deterrence—it did not transpire
as a response to a Western nuclear build-up, but rather
evolved as the most economical means to achieve an end. The
inferior position of the Soviet Union in nuclear striking
forces was the driving factor which caused the acceleration
\ JP V*rt-*-V» r»viACi-»ol ootn programs.
The period 1953-1957 is then marked by an increase in
strategic competition but for different reasons. The United
States was clearly the more reactive of the two parties as
defense planners consistently used worst case analysis. A
strong pattern of reaction to threats to its strategic superi-
ority emerged and was exacerbated by exuberant claims of
Soviet nuclear prowess. The Soviets, on the other hand,
reacted strongly in the area of air defense, but developments
in bomber and missile technology appear to have been more
evolutionary, receiving impetus from the Soviet's strategically
inferior position.
By the time this period nears its end, a common tendency,
present earlier but not so obvious, begins to solidify. Both
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sides were now giving the highest priorities to expanding and
perfecting strategic deterrence capabilities. Although the
basic deterrence concepts differed because of the actual
delivery capabilities of their strategic forces, the effect
was the same. Neither side seemed willing to trade Paris for
Moscow. The Soviets continued to hold Europe hostage, though
by this time it was with nuclear weapons. Still unable to
strike the United States, the deterrent capability of the
Soviet Union had shown only qualitative improvement.
Thus we come to the fourth and final period—1957-1961.
In this period the interactive pattern of the previous four
years continued with little change. Those programs initiated
earlier by the Soviets continued toward completion, and the
United States was again stampeded, into another massive
building program.
1957-1961
In 1957 the "bomber gap" had not fully subsided when a
second and ultimately more dangerous gap, the "missile gap,"
was perpetrated by the Soviet Union. Twice within the same
decade they made exactly the same mistake with identical
results—overwhelming United States strategic superiority of
an even greater magnitude than before the incident.
There is little question that the United States was the
more reactive of the two powers in this period. For the first
time the Soviet Union enjoyed a brief lead in a major field
of advanced technology. Soviet successes and premature
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attempts to use "missile diplomacy" served to convince the
American public and many of the decision-makers in the United
States that the strategic superiority of SAC could soon be
nullified.
Threatened by a Soviet verbal overkill, the United States
undertook many different crash programs in missile development.
Four intercontinental-range ballistic missiles and one sub-
marine launched ballistic missile emerged—Atlas, Titan I,
Titan II, Minuteman I, and Polaris. In addition, two IRBM's
Thor and Jupiter, were developed using current technology to
allow for their rapid overseas deployment. By throwing its
overwhelming resources into such development, the United
States rapidly closed what appeared to be a "missile gap."
In reality the crash programs probably were not needed and,
whatever small initial advantage the Soviets might have
enjoyed quickly vanished. The familiar superior-inferior
relationship in strategic capabilities established early in
the post-World War II era was reaffirmed.
From the very beginning the Soviets demonstrated an appar-
ent lack of concern or understanding of how their actions
would affect the United States. As in the earlier period
which had so dramatically worked to their disadvantage in
producing the "bomber gap," the Soviets appear to have taken
calculated steps designed to give an illusion of missile
superiority to conceal their weakness in strategic weapons
systems. This gave their large conventional forces greater
credibility to meet all but nuclear aggression, and was a
partial answer to the "massive retaliation" policy of the
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Eisenhower Administration. The "missile gap" endeavor differed
from that of the "bomber gap" only in that the Soviets demon-
strated an initial superiority in this system. The result was,
once again, an escalation of the arms race in which the Soviet
Union was either unwilling, or more probably, unable to compete
with the United States on equal terms.
With an appearance of superior strategic capability, Soviet
leadership accrued to itself a more powerful bargaining posi-
tion in world politics. Their apparent willingness to play
the charade to the fullest was an extremely dangerous game,
however. Khrushchev's overacting with his "rocket rattling"
and missile boasts in many respects played into the hands of
those advocating an even stronger strategic position for the
Unit-ed States. Partisan politics further fostered the fear
of the Soviet menace.
When the "missile gap" scare was finally dispelled, the
Soviets were not only facing a larger bomber deficit, they
also faced an ever widening missile deficit. What few mis-
siles they had were of the highly vulnerable, first genera-





Throughout the entire period examined, from 1945 to 196l,
one principal tendency was exhibited by both powers. This
was the high priority both gave to strategic deterrence. In
the early period this was a one-sided endeavor because of
the United States' monopoly in nuclear weapons. Not until
the Soviets developed nuclear weapons of their own were they
able to play an effective role in this deadly game. The
priorities of strategic deterrence became exaggerated as
thermonuclear weapons came into being.
Considerable differences in strategic deterrence con-
cepts emerged which were primarily the result of the economic
and technological base from which the two worked.
While no single pattern of strategic interaction seems
to have emerged, one distinct characteristic became manifest.
From the outset the United States held a sizeable margin of
strategic superiority. The Soviet Union was the challenger,
compelled to try to match the strategic weapons of the
United States. Unable to compete effectively on this level,
the Soviets were forced to engage in a facade designed to
project an image of power. The United States consistently
reacted strongly even when enjoying a decisive weapons margin
if the perceived threat was to its strategic superiority.
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